August 6, 2007

“What Right Could Look Like”

The Thunder Run was given an opportunity recently that I could just not pass up, the chance to interview a battlefield commander: LTC Fred Johnson, Deputy Commander of 3-2 Stryker Brigade Combat Team on the ground in Baqoubah, Iraq. This interview could not have happened without the support and knowledge of Michael Yon, who introduced me to LTC Johnson, thank you Mike.

LTC Johnson is from Centralia Illinois and was born 10 January 1962. He received his commission as a Second Lieutenant of Infantry through ROTC at Wofford College in Spartanburg, SC in 1985. His assignments include the 10th Mtn DIV at Fort Drum, NY twice, the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), the Joint Readiness Training Center, Battalion Command of 2-39 IN at Fort Jackson, SC and he is now the Deputy Commander of 3-2 Stryker Brigade Combat Team. He served in Desert Storm with the 101st and Bosnia with 1st Armored Division while assigned to the Center for Army Lessons Learned. He has also served as an advisor to a National Guard Infantry Battalion in Panama City , Florida. He is married to Dr. Laura Eckler Johnson and has a 10-year-old daughter named Maddie Gail.


LTC Johnson thank you for agreeing to be interviewed by The Thunder Run, can you give us an overview of your mission in the Iraqi theater of operations?
“We started as battle space owners in Mosul with responsibility for all of Ninewa Province. We were there about 5 months and then we were directed to move to Baghdad and become the MNC-I Operational Reserve and the Strike Force for MND-B. En route to Baghdad we conducted an in-stride reconnaissance in force of Lake Thar Thar to confirm or deny AQI presence there. We were the Strike Force in Baghdad for 6 months, clearing areas in coordination with other Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs) in every Beladahyia in the city. In total, we conducted 10 Brigade-level clearance missions. We also executed battalion-level Operational Reserve (OPRES) missions to Karballa, Najaf, the southern and northern belts of Baghdad , and Diweniyah. About 50 days ago we were directed to attack and clear the city of Baqubah of alQaeda in Iraq (AQI) presence and set conditions for control of the city by follow-on forces. We attacked the city on 19 June 07 and continue to conduct operations to secure the neighborhoods.”


Recently I’ve been seeing more press releases coming out of Iraq that state that Coalition Forces were tipped off about a cache or insurgent operatives in the area by the locals. In fact in a press release from MNF-I while on a tour of Baqouba you were quoted as saying that the “neighborhoods are heading in the right direction. What wins the war is normalcy, the work that’s being done by the Iraqi army, the municipal government, the civilians – by those people that want to take hold of their future – that’s where the war is won…” This is a significant step forward for the Iraqis are you seeing more and this in your Area of Operations?
“We are seeing more of this everyday, particularly in the neighborhoods where services are working and the citizens are secured by Iraqi Army, Police and concerned local citizens who have volunteered to protect their neighborhoods.”

Are you hearing reports of this occurring in other areas of the country?
“We definitely saw it in Mosul and it continues with the hard work of 4-1 CAV. It is much more difficult in Baghdad , but many of the BCTs have accomplished the same thing we’ve seen here in Baqubah and what has been reported in Ramadi and the rest of Al Anbar. In fact, our leadership visited COL Charlton’s team there to gain lessons learned and we implemented those lessons in our operations in Baqubah. We also went to school on the BCT’s in Baghdad who really do this kind of work well, particularly 2-2 INF, the Dagger Brigade, and Falcon Brigade in their respective areas of operation.”

In Mosul and Diyala we have heard stories of locals stepping up to help Coalition Forces as well as Iraqi Security Forces such as the IA and IP. Since al Qaeda had claimed Baqouba as its “capital,” how significant do you think this is for al Qaeda that the locals are now beginning to openly turn on them?
“This also has happened in Baghdad in Ameriya with the Dagger Brigade and other places. It’ll occur in those places when the civilians get tired of AQI’s abuse and or they want to protect their families from other sectarian extremist and criminal elements. As much so, however, it’s about citizens wanting to be a part of the process again and this is central to our success. The tipping point of successful counter-insurgencies is when the local citizens turn on the insurgents and when loosely aligned insurgent groups turn on one another and side with fighting the counter-insurgency.”

When I read the Milblogs it seems to be a general statement that the locals appreciate that Coalition Forces are there. Based upon their current willingness to step up, we can surmise that they are appreciating your presence in Baqouba also but what do you think was the tipping point for them to begin openly assisting you by supplying actionable intel?
“We get actionable intelligence everyday and started getting [it] about a week or so into the operation.”

Repairing and building infrastructure while simultaneously fighting and destroying the enemy is doing two things at the same time. Has that worked for our forces, or should we focus all of our efforts on winning with the promise of re-building after the hostilities are over?
“COL Steve Townsend, the 3-2 Stryker Brigade Commander organized his command and control in such a way that he oriented his effort fighting AQI and working with the Iraqi Army and Police and transitioning the control of the city over to them. He tasked me as his Deputy Commander to work reconstruction and restoring essential services. The main effort is clearly securing the population and that is what COL Townsend does day in and day out. However, every day I’m required to brief him on the status of our reconstruction effort. In the early stages of the operation I spent most of my time at the Government Center meeting with the civilian leadership of both city and Province. I had to learn as much about the city and how it operated as I could. That is one glaring problem with how we prepare for conducting this fight and that is we come into it not fully understanding how the Iraqi government and systems operate. We receive classes on cultural awareness, e.g. not to eat with your left hand and never expose the soles of your feet, etc, but that is so secondary to gaining situational understanding of, for example, how the food system works. This has been my main effort – working with the government to re-establish the Public Distribution System (PDS). It’s a lot like food stamps in the US, but each Iraqi is entitled an allotment of food at a reduced price from the government (flour, rice, tea, sugar, beans, tomato paste, etc). There are food agents for about every 200 families and they coordinate and distribute the food received from various locations in Iraq. When AQI took over Baqubah, food stopped coming to the city because of “security reasons.” The real and perceived notion was that AQI was taking the food. This went on for 10 months – PDS essentially stopped and the system atrophied. For example, some food agents left, the mills closed so flour and rice couldn’t be produced, etc. My primary task given to me by COL Townsend was to help re-establish routine PDS to the citizens. It’s been difficult and made more so because I didn’t understand how PDS worked. Through trial and error and talking to the leaders, I’ve gained a general understanding but I still learn something everyday. In this respect our ignorance kills us and sometimes we make decisions, in good conscience that undermines how the Iraqis are accustomed to doing business. I had a conversation with a local today, for example. We have been delivering PDS food with the help of the Iraqi Army and we felt the system was coming back around. I asked the local, “How’s the PDS shipments coming along? It’s good to get the food now, right?” The local said, “We’re not getting PDS, we’re getting aid and we’ve always received aid. We want our PDS rations.” I told him, “you just got a delivery.” And the local said, “no, that was a partial ration and it was delivered by the Army, not my food agent. PDS comes from the agent.” What the citizens want and expect is normalcy – they want to live their lives as they are accustomed, not the way we may think is best or good enough.

But to answer your question, we were doing two things at once but not both with the same amount of resources simultaneously. The main effort was defeating AQI and protecting the population initially and most all the resources were directed toward that end. Reconstruction was a supporting effort initially. However, we wanted the transition to be seamless so as soon as the fighting stopped the civilians saw an immediate and tangible increase in services and a return to normalcy – life had to be better without AQI. Once AQI was gone the main effort went to transition and partnering with the Iraqi Security Forces and to the restoration of services and reconstruction. My team was small at first when we were still securing the city, but once AQI was defeated, the battalions focused their energy on helping the civilian government fix services. Reconstruction became the main effort.

An important note on this operation: The 5th IA Division took on the civil-military operations better than any unit we’ve worked with and the municipal government is a viable enabler, as well. This may astonish some folks: We have not spent one US dime on reconstruction – it has all been done by the Army and the municipal government. They’ve been clearing the roads of debris and trash; they’ve fixed every single water pipe and electricity transformer. Reconstruction in Baqubah has been accomplished by Iraqis and that is the most significant thing about what has been accomplished here (aside from conquering the Islamic State of Iraq and giving Baqubah back to the people).”

You noted in a previous email that on Thursday August 2, the mayor held a Muhktar Meeting this AM for all west-side leaders with the IA, IP and a Baqubah Guardian present and participating in the process, pushing this thing forward – how are the locals reacting to their new found roles as politicians and municipal leaders?
“We had our first meeting the other day and another is scheduled this coming week. The locals will hold their breaths until they see a complete return of services. They’ve seen coalition forces come and go and they’ve endured the roller coaster of high energy and progress followed by the demise of their lives with the occupation of their city by AQI. They are rightfully cynical.
I can't speak for the rest of the Province and definitely not Iraq, but this city, and places like Ramadi and Mosul, represent what right could look like.”
Are meetings like this a result of the surge, are we finally seeing some grass roots political progress in Iraq, or has there been progress going on that is just underreported?
“These kinds of meetings have always taken place – this is not unusual and not a result of the surge. At the local level in cities like Mosul and Baqubah you’ll see the grass root politics, leaders vying for influence. Here many leaders to include the Deputy Governor are members of the Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP), a primary Sunni group. The Governor, on the other hand, is Shi’a. I sat in a meeting and they were very cordial and work seemed to get done. There are rumors of in-fighting and power struggles, but I haven’t seen any really. But if there are, that’s OK as long as movement is forward. It’s too early for me to assess how that is going and it’s really out of my lane because I’m focused on the city government, which is fledgling.”

In conjunction with the new roles for the local elders/leaders, historically we can say that they are literally taking their lives in their own hands by cooperating with you, are we seeing al Qaeda targeting them more because of their involvement?
“I haven’t seen that yet.”
Michael Yon reported on the now infamous "baked children" story as well as the mass grave incident that IA attributed to AQI. Since there have been no retaliatory strikes against local leaders by AQI can we surmise then that AQI in your area is beaten, or have they just moved on to different targets?
“They're beat in Baqubah and I think they're leadership moved elsewhere, possibly to set up shop - I can't say for sure, of course where that is or their intentions. There will still be attacks here and it's just a matter of time, but not in the magnitude as before - they won't hold the city hostage. We're pretty certain fighters melted back into the populace and are waiting for an opportunity to attack. But every day there is progress in the city makes it more likely a citizen will point them out and pre-empt AQIs activities.”

How big of a deal was the recent Iraqi soccer team winning of the Asian Cup?
“It’s been mentioned several times, particularly by the Deputy Governor when he was talking to the Director Generals. He said, they need to work together like the soccer team did.”

Have you noticed any major changes to the local psyche in regards to a sense national pride instead of tribal/sectarian pride?
“There is not a real sectarian problem here because Baqubah is mostly Sunni. We’ll have to wait and see what happens when Shi’a start to move back into the city. However, there are several mixed neighborhoods that seem to be doing OK and several Shi’a enclaves in our area that have not had problems that we’ve identified.”

Is there anything else you’d like to add?
“I'd like to caveat a point - the Baqubah Guardians and concerned local nationals, along with an IP force from the neighborhoods are central to the total defeat of AQI here and elsewhere ... I cannot over emphasize the importance of the home grown police forces. There are some folks who'll say they're militias by a different name - that is not the case. It's no different the deputized police in the US ... a person from Peoria doesn't join the police force to work in Topeka - they join it to protect their families and friends in the city they're from. I think sometimes it takes an American example to provide some perspective. I pray we haven't become so arrogant as to forget where we have come from and our own issues with racism, sectarianism, genocide, civil war, etc and what we've done to over come those great problems. I was having a discussion with an Irishjournalist the other day and she made a poignant statement of her country's plight with the IRA and sectarianism there ... a COIN operation that took 40 plus years to reconcile. Perspective - It's all about perspective and keeping what's going on here in some sort of context.In the end, the question will be asked what came of this war - 8 million free Kurds, a Shi'a majority that can determine their destiny rather than living in an apartheid-like state, and the reconciliation of disenfranchised Sunnis. Regardless of the reasons why we came here, the fact remains a great good has already come of it and the rest is up to the
Iraqis.”

Fred

LTC Johnson, thank you for taking the time to answer my questions. It seems that there is significant progress taking place in Iraq, progress that for the most part goes unreported in the main stream media outlets. And that is a crying shame. This unreported progress is the cause of the poor attitude that many in America have towards the war, but as we can see, with just a little bit of digging you can get past what counts for most of the reporting in Iraq, a simple body count.

Iraqi units and municipal leaders are stepping up or rather they have been stepping up and doing what needs to be done to return their cities and villages to normal. As you stated earlier, this is what “right could look like.” I can only hope that the rest of America and many of our leaders agree with us that a “great good” has been accomplished in Iraq, it is not a failure and as LTC Johnson has pointed out, there is progress being made.

The problem as I see it is that there is a very vocal group in the US and in Congress that are refusing to see the progress being made and are now willing to set artificial timelines and benchmarks all the while ignoring the truth on the ground that in many areas of the country alQaeda has been defeated. When we hear the question what is victory, we now have our answer and it can be seen by looking at places like Mosul, Anbar, sections of Baghdad and Baqouba. Victory is a return to normalcy, and normalcy can only be achieved when the locals decide that being sucked into sectarian violence by insurgent groups is not for them and they shrug off their oppressors in favor of Iraqi Security Forces and Coalition Forces.

When that happens at the local level all over the country, then political factions in Baghdad will loose the power they have now and the real business of rebuilding the country and legitimizing the government. Based upon the progress being made, that day is not here yet, but it is a lot closer than it was a few months ago, a lot closer.
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