Elizabeth O'Bagy | Institute for the Study of War |
With
the help of thousands of fighters from Hezbollah, Iran, and Iraq,
Syrian President Bashar al-Assad has achieved one of his most important
military victories in the past two years by forcing the withdrawal of
opposition forces from the town of al-Qusayr. The town is located in
Homs province, an area central to the success of Assad’s overall
military strategy. It is located along the southern route from Damascus
through Homs province to the coast, at a juncture where regime forces
have struggled to maintain their grasp. Rebel control of al-Qusayr had
disrupted the regime’s critical ground line of supply from Lebanon’s
Bekaa Valley and allowed for the cross-border movement of arms to
rebels. Control of al-Qusayr now secures the regime’s line of
communication from Damascus to the coast. Al-Qusayr now also cuts off
access to cross-border weapons supplies to the rebels from Lebanon and
provides an important staging ground for future efforts by the regime to
retake the north and east.
The
regime launched a major offensive against al-Qusayr in May 2013,
culminating in the regime’s successful routing of rebel troops from the
town in early June. The fall of al-Qusayr has thus effectively altered
the balance of power on the ground and serves as a critical turning
point in the civil war. With control of al-Qusayr, the regime can now
strengthen its position in Homs province overall and better position
itself to retake areas in the north and the east. Moreover, this regime
success demonstrates the degree to which the conflict is no longer
limited to Syria, but instead has engulfed the entire region, with
troops from neighboring countries, including Lebanese Hezbollah in large
numbers, reinforcing the regime's effort, and other regional and
foreign fighters supporting the opposition. To this end, the engagement
in al-Qusayr has escalated cross-border operations by both sides.
The
regime has been fighting for control of Homs province since its major
offensive in the city in February 2012. By early May 2012, following a
U.N. brokered cease-fire, only sporadic street fighting and shelling
occurred in Homs city and the surrounding area. During this time, the
government controlled the majority of the city, with the opposition
holding less than a fifth of Homs while fighting for control of a
similar-sized area was still ongoing.
[1] By mid-December 2012, the Syrian army had
regained control of nearly all of the remaining portions of Homs city,
except the Old City, Deir Baalba, and Khalidiya districts where rebels
continued to hold out under the army’s siege. By the end of the month,
government forces had recaptured Deir Baalba as well and were making
significant inroads against the remaining rebel-held districts.
[2] In March 2013, the Syrian government hoped
to conclusively consolidate its control of the city and launched a
major offensive into rebel-held territory.
[3] However, thanks to opposition reinforcements
that arrived from al-Qusayr, the rebels were able to push back
government forces. By mid-March, they launched their own offensive into
Bab Amr, attacking numerous government positions within the key
district. Heavy fighting ensued.
[4] Although it is uncertain how much of Bab Amr
the rebels were able to recapture or continue to hold while under
intense shelling by the Syrian regime, is was clear that government
forces were struggling to maintain their positions and were at the risk
of suffering major setbacks.
It
was at this time in March 2013 that rebel commanders began reporting
increasing numbers of Hezbollah troops in al-Qusayr. Although this was
not a new phenomenon, the density of Hezbollah forces openly operating
in conjunction with Syrian military forces was unprecedented. The
border around al-Qusayr has never officially been settled, and many
Shi‘a living in farming villages on the Syrian side of the border hold
Lebanese passports. This had initially allowed Hezbollah to justify its
activities in the area, and Hezbollah Secretary-General Hassan
Nasrallah early on claimed that those fighting near al-Qusayr were
individual members of Hezbollah, acting of their own volition and not
under party orders. But by October 2012, with the death of a senior
commander near al-Qusayr it had become clear that Hezbollah was openly
operating in the area under command and control of its leadership.
Since
this time, Hezbollah’s involvement has shifted dramatically. By the
end of March and early April 2013, Government forces were in danger of
losing critical territory in Homs city. They were only able to hold on
and push back against rebel forces due to the support of Hezbollah
moving fully into the territory to fight on behalf of the Syrian
government with entire units from the Bekaa Valley and Hermel mobilized.
Hezbollah forces attacked rebel positions in and around al-Qusayr and
reportedly committed a number of massacres in surrounding villages,
forcing rebels to send reinforcements to al-Qusayr and stalling their
offensive in Homs city. Hezbollah troops then squeezed rebel positions
from the southwest, while the government regained territory in Homs
city and pushed in on rebels from the northeast. Effectively,
government forces and Hezbollah coordinated to place al-Qusayr under
siege and isolate the rebels within the city.
[5] Beginning in April, pro-regime forces managed
to clear rebels from much of the countryside and isolate the town in
order to prevent a rebel withdrawal. Once villages were secured, the
surrounding area was subject to a build-up of government troops.
Reinforcements for the fight were drawn from units in Daraa and
Damascus. This strategy prevented the arrival of rebel reinforcements,
which failed to find a way into the besieged town. The siege also
barred the transfer of weapons to the area.
From
this enhanced position, the regime launched a major offensive against
al-Qusayr in early May 2013. In this offensive, regime troops combined
with guerrilla detachments of Hezbollah and the militia-like National
Defense Force. Government forces deployed artillery and airpower
against the town, enabling bombardments that weakened rebel positions.
Many rebels feared that they would be quickly defeated in the wake of
the government offensive. One commander from the opposition al-Haqq
Brigade stated, “If we hold our positions through the week it will be a
miracle.”
[6] Nearly twenty different opposition brigades
came together to organize operations and repel the offensive, including
the Farouq Brigades, the al-Haqq Brigade, the Mughaweer Battalion, the
Wadi Brigades, the Qassioun Battalion, and the Ayman Battalion.
Jabhat al-Nusra has also played a role, although their presence in
al-Qusayr has largely been exaggerated in media reporting. In mid-May,
it was reported that an important Jabhat al-Nusra commander, Abu Omar,
had been killed along with a number of his subordinates.
[7] It appears that other rebel groups benefited
from the death of Abu Omar by asserting their own leadership, and
Jabhat al-Nusra has since played a marginalized role in the fighting
with other rebel groups taking the lead.
Initially,
the rebels were able to hold their positions despite the relentless
bombardment, and managed to push back Hezbollah troops who took heavy
losses during the early stages of the offensive. The rebel’s success
was partly due to a surge in weapons and resources that were smuggled
into the town from Lebanon. Commanders from a variety of units were
reportedly sending men into Lebanon to stock up on weapons before
sending them back through Homs and into the remaining rebel-held
neighborhoods before reaching al-Qusayr. Throughout May, the opposition
groups in al-Qusayr were aided by a surge in reinforcements, with rebel
groups from as far away as Aleppo and al-Raqqa sending forces to aid
in the battle. These reinforcements amassed in areas around Rastan and
Talbissa, two important rebel strongholds that have been used as
launching points for attacks in Homs and al-Qusayr. Although these
reinforcements were largely prevented from entering the town itself,
they played a key role in targeting government convoys sending
reinforcements and supplies to pro-regime forces.
[8]
It was not until mid-May that their grasp began to slip on the city and, on May 19th,
Syrian forces stormed al-Qusayr. Although media reports stated that
Syrian forces had gained control of al-Qusayr’s city center and managed
to retake all but ten percent of the city, rebel commanders denied the
reports. Videos posted online confirmed that rebels continued to hold
the city center and much of the northern areas of the city at that
time.
[9] Fighting continued unabated with both sides
consolidating forces in and around the town through May. Rebel groups
from across Syria sent units to bolster their defense of al-Qusayr,
including the Tawhid Brigade from Aleppo, the Nasr Salahaddin Battalion
from al-Raqqa, and the Usra Brigade from Deir al-Zour. In early June,
video statements showed that at least some of these reinforcements had
managed to enter the city and participate in clashes with regime
troops.
[10] On the government side, reinforcements from the 3rd and 4th
Divisions and the Republican Guard were sent from Damascus to provide
greater infantry support. Some Damascus activists described a lightened
military presence in Damascus as regime troops were sent in greater
numbers to al-Qusayr.
[11]
With
the help of Hezbollah troops moving into Hamidiyah, the regime was
able to retake the Dabaa military base and gain considerable ground in
the southern section of the city by the end of May. From that time, the
regime slowly advanced on rebel positions in the city and managed to
cut off the majority of rebel supply lines. While conditions were dire
for the armed opposition besieged in al-Qusayr, the rebels managed to
maintain their positions in the western and northern sections of the
city, as well as in key areas of the city center. They also managed to
open an important corridor into the city near Shamsin from which they
were able to attack government positions. The rebels proved to be well
entrenched in al-Qusayr and aided through fortifications including
tunnels.
On
June 3, government forces heavily bombarded the rebel-controlled
northern area of al-Qusayr, leveling row after row of buildings in order
to deny rebels cover. Soon after, Hezbollah units carried out a ground
assault against the remaining operational opposition forces. This
combined attack proved to be the final assault necessary for the regime
and Hezbollah forces to force a negotiated withdrawal of rebel
fighters, who were running desperately low on weapons and ammunition.
Opposition forces were allowed to withdraw from al-Qusayr along a
narrow corridor of territory still under their control to reach the
villages of Dabaa and Buwaydah al-Sharqiyah. While the Syrian
government had formerly prevented the withdrawal of opposition
fighters, a Lebanese-brokered agreement between opposition fighters and
Hezbollah reportedly paved the way for a rebel withdrawal on the
condition that opposition fighters be allowed to evacuate families and
wounded people without being attacked.
[12] However, fighting has again broken out in
these areas along the northern edge of the town where opposition forces
continue to retreat, and government forces have been conducting
clearance operations to evict the remaining rebel forces.
[13]
Although
the regime success in al-Qusayr was quite slow, the well-coordinated
offensive proved to be successful in defeating rebels in the town. The
regime demonstrated a remarkable ability to adapt its military tactics
and strategically evolve in ways that made them much more effective
against the insurgency. To add to this, Hezbollah’s efforts shifted the
local balance of forces in the area. In combination with regular and
irregular regime elements, Hezbollah's contribution remains a key
contributor to the rebel defeat. Hezbollah has proven to be much more
effective in confronting rebel forces as they have better experience in
guerrilla tactics, unlike the ranks of Syria’s conventional army. To
this end, Hezbollah has played a key role in the regime's development
of effective irregular forces. It reportedly provides training and
advice to local militia groups, Popular Committee elements, and the
National Defense Army, all of which are playing a growing role in the
regime's defense. Many rebel commanders reported that fighting
Hezbollah troops was much more difficult than fighting against regime
troops because “they are better fighters” and “more professional” than
the Syrian army.
[14] For his part, Assad acknowledged his debt to
the movement, expressing “very high confidence, great satisfaction and
appreciation toward Hezbollah” and promising to “give them everything.”
[15]
Fighting
in al-Qusayr revealed a new regime approach to fighting its
insurgency. The Syrian government showed that it can use Hezbollah
fighters, and possibly Iraqi and Iranian fighters, as a reliable
infantry force alongside its own heavy weapons and airpower. The regime
displayed a sophisticated level of operations which included heavy
preparatory bombardment followed by the infiltration of irregular allied
units, and finally armor-supported infantry attacks. The three phases
of this strategy were jointly achieved through the coordination of
separate chains of command, a difficult task under the best of
circumstances. That the regime was able to cooperate so closely with
Hezbollah leadership in combining regular, irregular, and allied units
with separate functions speaks to the close nature of the relationship
between the Syrian government and Hezbollah. The battle in al-Qusayr is
unique in its proximity to Lebanon and the presence of so many Shi‘a
Lebanese villages in the area, giving Hezbollah an edge in the fighting.
Nevertheless, their increased involvement in battlefronts across Syria
will be a critical boost to the regime. Over time, the replenishment
of the regime's forces could allow Assad to rest and redeploy some of
his forces for operations elsewhere in Syria, including efforts to
retake certain rebel-held areas in the north and the east. This would
give the regime renewed offensive and defensive capabilities and
greater resources.
However,
it should be noted that mobilizing militia units drawn primarily from
Alawi and Shi‘a populations has its drawbacks. Command and control of
these irregular forces will likely become increasingly difficult, and
the Syrian government’s ability to control them may deteriorate over
time. Already, the fact that Hezbollah helped negotiate a withdrawal
despite the regime’s initial decision to prevent one suggests the
likelihood of future disagreements over strategy and objective.
Moreover, while there are clear short-term benefits, this mobilization
also produces greater sectarian polarization and thus threatens the
support Assad receives by critical portions of the Sunni community.
This type of strategy was avoided by former president Hafez al-Assad
who was clearly aware of the dangers of relying solely on minority
groups. He was careful to downplay sectarian rhetoric and sought to
build cross-sectarian patronage networks as part of the regime’s
embedded authoritarianism, which ultimately contributed to the regime’s
staying power. Losing Sunni support and relying on minority-drawn
militias could put the regime in a vulnerable position, and it is
unclear whether the government could then muster the manpower and
support needed to reclaim lost territory.
As
the conflict in Syria has protracted, the Assad regime has had time to
reconsolidate and renew its offensive capability through an increased
reliance on irregular forces and allied resources and support. This
support from Russia, Iran, and Hezbollah has exceeded the amount of
support going to the opposition, and has meant that the regime is far
better resourced than its opponents. As the regime has adapted its
strategy to match changing conditions, rebel forces have been unable to
effectively respond. This is partly due to command and organizational
issues that make it difficult to concentrate and coordinate significant
forces, but it is also due to the lack of supplies, including
much-needed ammunition, as well as their inability to withstand
airpower. Overall, the opposition simply lacks the means for more
effective resistance in the face of heavy bombardment by regime air
power and artillery. This vulnerability was evident in al-Qusayr, where
air power impeded resupply efforts and inflicted losses on opposition
forces.
Although
al-Qusayr may not be the decisive battle for Syria, it should be seen
as an important turning point. By reasserting its military superiority
in al-Qusayr, the regime has gained momentum, and through the help of
Hezbollah and Iranian forces, it will likely be able to consolidate its
control over the areas it now holds. This includes Syria’s most
populated and economically important districts. Control of these areas
will facilitate their advance on areas north of Homs province and
possibly allow them to reclaim important rebel-held areas in the north
and the east. Moreover, the regime victory effectively cuts off an
important supply route to the rebels which will leave the armed
opposition in an ever more weakened position. As for now, the regime
does not have the forces required to move on from al-Qusayr and advance
on other areas in the north. This means that the rebels have a brief
window while the regime resets its capabilities. This window may permit
them to develop a counteroffensive in order to disrupt the regime’s
opportunity to capitalize upon its victory at al-Qusayr. However, the
past performance of the armed opposition creates doubt over its ability
to so. In light of the regime’s regained strategic and operational
initiative, it will be even more difficult for the opposition moving
forward.
This
victory has also put the Syrian government in a better position as it
enters the upcoming summit in Geneva. It is now able to transform its
military advances into a stronger negotiating position, and there is
now little pressure for Assad to bargain in good faith. His gains could
even embolden Assad to push for all-out military victory rather than
participate in the peace talks being promoted by the United States and
Russia. This portends the failure of the summit and an end to
international efforts to resolve the conflict through negotiations. If
the international community truly seeks to enforce a negotiated
settlement, they will have to do something to decisively change the
balance of power on the ground ahead of the negotiations.
The
battle for al-Qusayr symbolizes the conflict’s transformation into a
regional imbroglio that can no longer be isolated within the Syrian
context. Since the fall of the town, rebel fighters have already
promised to take the fight to Hezbollah in Lebanon, launching over 18
rockets into Baalbek in a single day.
[16] This has had a major impact on furthering
sectarian polarization spilling over into Lebanon and Iraq, and
exacerbating the role of identity politics and sectarianism in the
region as a whole. While the defeat in al-Qusayr should not be seen as
the decisive battle for Syria or as a forecast of regime victory, it
does represent a new stage in the conflict through the open involvement
of Hezbollah and Iranian forces at the side of the regime. That the
regime was able to execute such an operation at this stage of the war
testifies to its resilience and adaptability, and, more importantly, to
the unswerving support of its allies Russia, Iran, and Hezbollah. The
support of these countries will allow for Assad to continue his
military onslaught, while the lack of a decision to reinforce the
opposition with the necessary resources ensures the rebels’ inferiority
on the battlefield and will ultimately result in the death of the
Geneva negotiations.
[1] Lyse Doucet, “Homs: a scarred and divided city,” BBC, May 9, 2012.
[2] Alison Tahmizian Meuse, “Syrian troops hit Homs, kill 23 children,” The Australian, December 30, 2012.
[3] “Syria rebels capture northern Raqqa city,” Al-Jazeera, March 5, 2013.
[4] Syrian Observatory for Human Rights Facebook Page, March 10, 2013.
[5] Interviews with Syrian rebels conducted via Skype in March, April 2013 and in person in Istanbul in May 2013.
[6] Interview with commander of Liwa al-Haq in al-Qusayr, conducted via Skype on May 3, 2013.
[7] Jim Kouri, “Islamists suffer setback in Syria with killing of al-Qaeda linked leader,” The Examiner, May 22, 2013.
[8] Interviews with rebel commanders in May 2013.
[9] “Al-Qusayr, Homs, Colonel Abdel Jabaar al-Iqaydi,” YouTube, June 2, 2013,
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=m2b6gRQ8_BI; interviews with commanders in May 2013.
[10] “Al-Qusayr, Homs, Colonel Abdel Jabaar al-Iqaydi;” interviews with commanders in May 2013.
[11] Interviews with Syrian commanders and
activists in May 2013; Jeffrey White, “The Qusayr Rules: The Syrian
Regime’s Changing Way of War,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, May 31, 2013.
[12] Saleh Hodaife, “Rebel withdrawal from al-Qusayr result of deal with Hezbollah,” NOW Lebanon, June 5, 2013.
[13] “Syria army deals severe blow to rebels in key town,” AP, June 5, 2013.
[14] Interviews with Syrian rebels conducted via Skype in March 2013.
[15] Liz Sly, “Assad forces gaining ground in Syria,” The Washington Post, May 11, 2013.
[16] “Syrian rockets hit Hezbollah stronghold in Lebanon, influential cleric fans sectarian flames,” AP, June 1, 2013.
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