Note that part of information we collect and keep as part of the ASCOPE/PMESII is the enemy message; their Information Operations (IO). We track their narrative, or conversation with the people. It’s not that hard to gather. We just ask the locals what the insurgent is saying about whatever. They will usually tell us, and they will look for a reaction. We make sure that we get it straight by asking as many people as possible, right down to the casual encounter on the street. This is something that we can include our sensing of the effects that we are having. We can also gather a lot of information about the way that the people react to insurgent IO.(READ MORE)
Is the insurgent message hitting home with the populace? Why? There will be a mixture of truths, half-truths and outright lies. Our job is to determine which is which and from there figure out why the insurgent message either appeals to the people or freezes them in place on the fence; unwilling or afraid to commit to supporting or even acquiescing to government rule.
Showing posts with label COIN. Show all posts
Showing posts with label COIN. Show all posts
February 23, 2011
COIN Primer: The Conversation
From Afghan Quest by Old Blue -
November 24, 2009
Counterterror Strategy for The AF/Pak Theater
A Smaller Footprint, a Target On Terrorists
The Counterterror option would reduce the number of forces we have in Afghanistan and rely on Special Operations raids and UAV drone strikes to target al Qaeda and other extremist groups.
The other option to Gen. McChrystal's call for a fully-resourced Population Centric Counterinsurgency, is to rely on a much smaller footprint and Counterterrorism (CT) in the Afghanistan/Pakistan theater. In an age of Jack Bauer, CT is very appealing, with our most elite troops swooping in, riding black helicopters, and killing terrorists. Or the vision of silent predator drones tracking bad guys across the wastelands before unleashing a literal Hellfire which destroy the enemy. These end games happen only after long periods of intelligence gathering and planning, sitting on rocks in the mountains watching and waiting. In fact, most missions never happen because actionable intelligence, resources and timing just don't come together. But when they do, it is devastating to the enemy.
Our CT efforts in this theater over the past several years have been very fruitful as hundreds of Taliban, al Qaeda and other extremists have been killed or captured. Gen. McChrystal, now the commander of all forces in Afghanistan, previously commanded the unit responsible for the successes there, as well as those in Iraq. Among the many terrorists they eliminated, this unit was responsible for dispatching Zarqawi and ending his reign of terror in Iraq. Gen. McChrystal has been known to accompany his men on raids, leading from the front. His Task Forces - comprised of SEALs, Rangers, Delta operators and many others - have done tremendous damage to the terrorists and,
more importantly, to the networks that support them.
But CT is not simply roving bands of black-clad, rough men doing violence in the night. There is an entire host of other operations, admin and support functions that have to be working perfectly together to put this deadly ballet into play. The single most important need for an effective CT operation is accurate and precise intelligence. Without actionable intelligence, the entire purpose of CT, precise strikes against positively identified targets, is impossible.
A CT operation by definition does not have a large footprint out among the populace. A CT strike comes out of nowhere, acts with swift and precise violence and then is gone. Ideally the force hits quickly and all the enemy are dead or captured. But, before that mission is even remotely possible, the intelligence must be gathered and developed to identify targets and plan a successful raid.
In CT, almost all of the intelligence gathering will be done covertly or electronically. It requires coordination between multiple intelligence agencies with human and electronic sources, large amounts of work analyzing disparate pieces of information, and cross-checking all of these against each other. In addition some of the information comes from other governments and, therefore, accuracy, as well as differing motives, must be taken into account. While our spy satellites and eavesdropping capabilities are useful, the best information comes from people, agents among the enemy, from the locals where they live, or from captured terrorists themselves. Spy handlers, translators, interrogators, analysts and others must all work in concert to create usable intelligence. It is incredibly difficult to sort and evaluate all of this in a timely enough fashion that it leads to a mission. But as we have seen over the past several years, it can be done.
Conversely, in a Counterinsurgency (COIN) operation, much of the intelligence comes from the close contact the troops have while living among the local populace. After sacrifices are shared, rapport is built, and trust is gained with the locals. This enormous effort produces information from the local populace on who does or does not belong in a particular village. When the locals still fear the insurgents or terrorists among them, they will not inform on them. Once the COIN strategy takes hold, the locals see US and Afghan security forces as providing safety and prosperity, and they are willing to identify infiltrators. It is important to note that, without a COIN operation, CT will not have a substantial “boots on the ground” view.
Coordination with the host nation and it's military and intelligence units is vital to the success of CT operations. They have the home field advantage and can use that in ways we simply cannot. In addition, we need to have bases to operate from close enough to hit targets in quick time windows. We have helicopters, UAVs, other vehicles, personnel, weapons, and communications gear that must have a home and, if possible, at a secure, undisclosed location. We also must help the host nation manage the inevitable fall out from even the most successful CT operations; people will die and claims will be made that they were innocent civilians. This puts ressure on the host nation to distance themselves from these strikes, and makes it difficult for them to support the operations publicly.
If CT becomes the strategy for this theater and we reduce our footprint in Afghanistan significantly, an aggravating factor will be a larger area where al Qaeda and Taliban elements can hide. Currently, most are in the tribal regions of Pakistan, and, as we remove forces from Afghanistan, the enemy will fill that void. Without a COIN strategy in effect and less forces on the ground, we will be left with a much larger zone that we need to cover with intelligence and surveillance assets. This opportunity will offer the enemy additional safe havens where they can refit and recruit.
It is important to note that these difficulties are offset by the smaller number of our own forces who are in direct danger. Force protection for our forces will become easier, and we can locate the troops that remain on large bases where they will not be exposed. CT operations, keeping the enemy off balance, would ensure that large groups of enemy could not mass to attack them.
Our goal would be to degrade the enemy by attrition and never allow any significant elements to form. As soon as the enemy built a training camp or gathered in numbers, their activity would trigger a raid or a strike. If the intelligence is actionable, it can be effective in ensuring that both Afghanistan and Pakistan do not serve as safe havens where terror can be planned and launched.
In order for this mission to be successful, it requires extensive improvements to both Afghan security forces as well as the functions of the central government itself. Our presence there, even in reduced numbers for a CT mission, requires a stable central government to host our forces, and we must train and help field enough Afghan security forces to eventually take the mission over from us. The end game for both COIN and CT is a hand off to the Afghans of responsibility for their own security.
Authors:
Matt Burden has supported counterterror operations in Southwest Asia, the Balkans and Africa as Commander and Executive officer of an classified intelligence detachment.
Danny Strickland has conducted counterterror operations as a member of 1st Ranger Bn. and subsequently as a member of a classified Special Operations unit.
Jim Hanson has conducted counterinsurgency and counterterror operations as a member of a Special Forces detachment in multiple countries throughout the Pacific Rim.
The Counterterror option would reduce the number of forces we have in Afghanistan and rely on Special Operations raids and UAV drone strikes to target al Qaeda and other extremist groups.
The other option to Gen. McChrystal's call for a fully-resourced Population Centric Counterinsurgency, is to rely on a much smaller footprint and Counterterrorism (CT) in the Afghanistan/Pakistan theater. In an age of Jack Bauer, CT is very appealing, with our most elite troops swooping in, riding black helicopters, and killing terrorists. Or the vision of silent predator drones tracking bad guys across the wastelands before unleashing a literal Hellfire which destroy the enemy. These end games happen only after long periods of intelligence gathering and planning, sitting on rocks in the mountains watching and waiting. In fact, most missions never happen because actionable intelligence, resources and timing just don't come together. But when they do, it is devastating to the enemy.
Our CT efforts in this theater over the past several years have been very fruitful as hundreds of Taliban, al Qaeda and other extremists have been killed or captured. Gen. McChrystal, now the commander of all forces in Afghanistan, previously commanded the unit responsible for the successes there, as well as those in Iraq. Among the many terrorists they eliminated, this unit was responsible for dispatching Zarqawi and ending his reign of terror in Iraq. Gen. McChrystal has been known to accompany his men on raids, leading from the front. His Task Forces - comprised of SEALs, Rangers, Delta operators and many others - have done tremendous damage to the terrorists and,
more importantly, to the networks that support them.
But CT is not simply roving bands of black-clad, rough men doing violence in the night. There is an entire host of other operations, admin and support functions that have to be working perfectly together to put this deadly ballet into play. The single most important need for an effective CT operation is accurate and precise intelligence. Without actionable intelligence, the entire purpose of CT, precise strikes against positively identified targets, is impossible.
A CT operation by definition does not have a large footprint out among the populace. A CT strike comes out of nowhere, acts with swift and precise violence and then is gone. Ideally the force hits quickly and all the enemy are dead or captured. But, before that mission is even remotely possible, the intelligence must be gathered and developed to identify targets and plan a successful raid.
In CT, almost all of the intelligence gathering will be done covertly or electronically. It requires coordination between multiple intelligence agencies with human and electronic sources, large amounts of work analyzing disparate pieces of information, and cross-checking all of these against each other. In addition some of the information comes from other governments and, therefore, accuracy, as well as differing motives, must be taken into account. While our spy satellites and eavesdropping capabilities are useful, the best information comes from people, agents among the enemy, from the locals where they live, or from captured terrorists themselves. Spy handlers, translators, interrogators, analysts and others must all work in concert to create usable intelligence. It is incredibly difficult to sort and evaluate all of this in a timely enough fashion that it leads to a mission. But as we have seen over the past several years, it can be done.
Conversely, in a Counterinsurgency (COIN) operation, much of the intelligence comes from the close contact the troops have while living among the local populace. After sacrifices are shared, rapport is built, and trust is gained with the locals. This enormous effort produces information from the local populace on who does or does not belong in a particular village. When the locals still fear the insurgents or terrorists among them, they will not inform on them. Once the COIN strategy takes hold, the locals see US and Afghan security forces as providing safety and prosperity, and they are willing to identify infiltrators. It is important to note that, without a COIN operation, CT will not have a substantial “boots on the ground” view.
Coordination with the host nation and it's military and intelligence units is vital to the success of CT operations. They have the home field advantage and can use that in ways we simply cannot. In addition, we need to have bases to operate from close enough to hit targets in quick time windows. We have helicopters, UAVs, other vehicles, personnel, weapons, and communications gear that must have a home and, if possible, at a secure, undisclosed location. We also must help the host nation manage the inevitable fall out from even the most successful CT operations; people will die and claims will be made that they were innocent civilians. This puts ressure on the host nation to distance themselves from these strikes, and makes it difficult for them to support the operations publicly.
If CT becomes the strategy for this theater and we reduce our footprint in Afghanistan significantly, an aggravating factor will be a larger area where al Qaeda and Taliban elements can hide. Currently, most are in the tribal regions of Pakistan, and, as we remove forces from Afghanistan, the enemy will fill that void. Without a COIN strategy in effect and less forces on the ground, we will be left with a much larger zone that we need to cover with intelligence and surveillance assets. This opportunity will offer the enemy additional safe havens where they can refit and recruit.
It is important to note that these difficulties are offset by the smaller number of our own forces who are in direct danger. Force protection for our forces will become easier, and we can locate the troops that remain on large bases where they will not be exposed. CT operations, keeping the enemy off balance, would ensure that large groups of enemy could not mass to attack them.
Our goal would be to degrade the enemy by attrition and never allow any significant elements to form. As soon as the enemy built a training camp or gathered in numbers, their activity would trigger a raid or a strike. If the intelligence is actionable, it can be effective in ensuring that both Afghanistan and Pakistan do not serve as safe havens where terror can be planned and launched.
In order for this mission to be successful, it requires extensive improvements to both Afghan security forces as well as the functions of the central government itself. Our presence there, even in reduced numbers for a CT mission, requires a stable central government to host our forces, and we must train and help field enough Afghan security forces to eventually take the mission over from us. The end game for both COIN and CT is a hand off to the Afghans of responsibility for their own security.
Authors:
Matt Burden has supported counterterror operations in Southwest Asia, the Balkans and Africa as Commander and Executive officer of an classified intelligence detachment.
Danny Strickland has conducted counterterror operations as a member of 1st Ranger Bn. and subsequently as a member of a classified Special Operations unit.
Jim Hanson has conducted counterinsurgency and counterterror operations as a member of a Special Forces detachment in multiple countries throughout the Pacific Rim.
A Primer on Population-Centric Counterinsurgency
What worked in Iraq, and what can work in Afghanistan
Counterinsurgency is hardly a new concept. Throughout history, nations have dealt with attempts to destabilize or overthrow them. The organs of power belong to the government, but if the insurgency has popular support, or strikes fear into the people, that power may be difficult to wield. The stronger a central government is, the easier it is to clamp down on opposing organic or foreign elements employing guerrilla tactics.
The question becomes, will the government and it's allies attempt to gain the help of the populace by force or by conversion?
If guerrillas are swimming like fish in the waters of the citizenry, a nation must convince its people that they do not want to shelter them. Historically, this has been achieved by force and fear, if achieved at all. Whether an empire is protecting its possessions or a nation is protecting its sovereignty, uprisings have often been dealt with swiftly and violently. Those supporting the insurgents are identified and killed; sometimes they aren't even supporters, just unfortunates who served as an example of the stateʼs power. A popular uprising can become unpopular quickly if relatives and family members killed. Destroying the crops and livelihoods and razing the countryside leaves little for a guerrilla force trying to sustain itself. Brutality may not be pretty, but it can be extremely effective.
The United States now employs a more civilized approach to persuade citizens to deny aid and sanctuary to insurgents. The strategy of population-centric counterinsurgency (COIN) involves separating insurgents from the populace and convincing the people and the more moderate insurgents that the government represents security and an increased quality of life.
These are not new concepts; American military theorist Col. John Boyd write up the exact definition of population-centric COIN in his monograph ʻPatterns of Conflictʼ written in response to the escalating Vietnam war:
This approach is more difficult and dangerous for security forces in the beginning, but pays dividends as the locals gain trust and begin to offer information about insurgent activities. It becomes possible to use targeted strikes and raids to harass and eliminate insurgents with minimal danger to civilians.
We have seen in Iraq and example of how this can succeed. Iraq was a complex mix of three insurgencies, the Shia militias, the Sunni Baathists and foreign Al-Qaeda elements. The groups had differing goals, allegiances and motivations, but shared a desire to expel U.S. forces, and to gain influence over the nascent Iraqi central government. Additionally, a civil war was ongoing between Sunni and Shia insurgents; longtime religious and tribal feuds turned into active, targeted kidnappings and killings.
Many factors contributed to the successes in Iraq including the Anbar Awakening, the marginalization of Moqtada al Sadr, the increasing proficiency of Iraqi security forces and a shift of United States strategy to population-centric COIN, along with the sufficient forces to do so. These factors are interconnected, and an approach focused on securing the civilian populace could have hastened them, had it been implemented earlier.
The Anbar Awakening was driven largely by a realization that the Al-Qaeda elements and Baathists were killing more Iraqis than Americans. The Sheiks came to determine that their responsibility to safeguard their people forced them to expel the foreign guerrillas and reign in those of their own who were perpetrating these outrages. A concerted effort over a number of years by U.S. forces had gained a level of trust that allowed an alliance of convenience between the tribes and the United States against the insurgents. This denied sanctuary to Al-Qaeda elements, and many former Baathist insurgents morphed into Sons of Iraq now responsible for security in their villages. Once the locals determined this was a viable and lasting situation a virtuous cycle began and they gave more intelligence on the remaining insurgents who were killed or captured. The U.S. and Iraqi forces jointly maintained security after each area was cleared. This was the key as US forces left their large bases and deployed out among the Iraqis to share their sacrifices.
As the Surge forces came into play the switch to pop-centric COIN had been made, but there were still many kinetic engagements as areas of insurgent control were entered and cleared. The difference was the U.S. forces stayed and set up alongside Iraqi security to ensure that the areas stayed safe. Local police were augmented and over time were able to become the primary guarantors of peace. In actions to clear areas controlled by Shia Militias, the Iraqi Army made some of its first major offensive operations and showed that the central government could impose its will and ensure the insurgents could not operate with impunity. The United States spent considerable time, effort and energy building, training and equipping the Iraqi forces and also that they were committed to staying long enough to quell the violence and not leave until the Iraqis could handle security themselves. When they showed they could defeat the militias in Sadr City, they achieved two things: a military victory and proof that the Shia-dominated government would fight against rogue Shia elements. This was essential to gaining the trust of Sunnis and Kurds. As more villages and cities were pacified, insurgents found fewer places to hide, and the vast majority of the country was secured.
This allowed the United States to negotiate a security agreement with the Iraqi government, pulling forces back and leaving Iraqis to provide their own security. That process is continuing, and while there are still outbursts of violence, the insurgencies are effectively defeated. Many challenges lie ahead for the country, but the strategies and tactics employed by U.S. and Iraqis, chiefly the pop-centric COIN, worked.
The question now becomes can these successes and strategies be transferred to Afghanistan. The answer: Yes, it can; quite effectively.
The basic tactics that compose a pop-centric COIN strategy remain applicable:
Safeguard the population;
Deny the insurgents safe haven;
Share sacrifices with the civilians to build rapport;
Demonstrate that the government brings security and prosperity;
The culture in Afghanistan is fiercely tribal. Each tribe must be treated as a separate country, more or less. Personal relationships take time and trust to build, but are the only way to convince the locals that the insurgents are not more powerful. Many local leaders have been killed when they cooperated with the coalition and then our forces left the area. They must be convinced that we are there to stay and will only leave once the Afghan security apparatus can keep them safe.
The scenario should play out like this:
U.S. and Afghan security forces arrive in the village and meet with tribal elders to illustrate that they are staying for the duration. Living arrangements are negotiated with an emphasis on living among the villagers. A defensible stronghold is established to be used in the event of a mass attack. The local leaders are asked what projects could improve the quality of life. Maximum interaction between the forces and the villagers is encouraged. Locals are recruited to work on civil improvement projects, and to also become part of the security apparatus. Meals, work and daily life become a shared existence; rapport is built. With that comes trust and the belief that security and prosperity come from this partnership. This grows to eclipse the fear of reprisals from the insurgents, and the idea that the government is a force for good takes hold.
As the Afghan security forces increase in number and competence, they replace U.S. forces and are augmented by locals to ensure that the insurgents cannot gain a foothold as the United States draws back.
This is not a quick solution; it is a decidedly long war initiative. But it has the advantage of diminishing violence as it progresses. Initially, there will be kinetic engagements and casualties as insurgents are pushed out of areas where they have influence. The risks are much heavier at the beginning because the locals wonʼt be as trusting or willing to help. Their support is won by showing them that the United States and the Afghan security forces value their safety. The tactics must cause as little collateral damage to the people as possible. That means accepting a greater danger to joint forces in the initial stages. But this is an investment to reap a reward: greater cooperation from the locals as they see who has their best interests at heart.
This strategy must be implemented in stages. As areas are pacified, the footprint increases. It must be done in conjunction with a major effort to recruit, train and deploy competent Afghan security forces – mostly Army and paramilitary police who can hold their own against insurgents. U.S. forces cannot garrison the entire country, but they can help clear areas, and then leave them in the hands of a combination of national and local security. Once a secure environment is created, the civilian surge must flow in. Infrastructure, health, agriculture and other quality-of-life projects must begin.
These will be what seal the deal. This must involve the State Department, USAID and NGOs, and especially agencies of the Afghan government who can safely operate in the now-secured areas. They will show that the national government is not a corrupt enterprise, but a structure to help the Afghan people. The people will then invest in the notion of a nation, creating an incentive to resist attempts by insurgents to re-infiltrate or recruit.
Many factors make this a difficult strategy to implement in a country with forbidding terrain, fractious tribal rivalries and a history of antipathy to outsiders. But if the goal is to foster a country that will not serve as a breeding ground and sanctuary for extremist violence, this is the most likely path. It will take resources, commitment and patience, and after seven years that is difficult to consider. But the alternative is to cede the battlefield and yield victory to the Taliban and Al-Qaeda – who will gain credibility, power and recruits within Afghanistan and worldwide. Which is more difficult to consider?
Authors:
John Wagner- Served in Iraq with MNF-I
Mark Seavey- Served in Afghanistan with the US Army Infantry
Jim Hanson- Conducted Counterinsurgency operations in multiple Pacific Rim
countries
Counterinsurgency is hardly a new concept. Throughout history, nations have dealt with attempts to destabilize or overthrow them. The organs of power belong to the government, but if the insurgency has popular support, or strikes fear into the people, that power may be difficult to wield. The stronger a central government is, the easier it is to clamp down on opposing organic or foreign elements employing guerrilla tactics.
The question becomes, will the government and it's allies attempt to gain the help of the populace by force or by conversion?
If guerrillas are swimming like fish in the waters of the citizenry, a nation must convince its people that they do not want to shelter them. Historically, this has been achieved by force and fear, if achieved at all. Whether an empire is protecting its possessions or a nation is protecting its sovereignty, uprisings have often been dealt with swiftly and violently. Those supporting the insurgents are identified and killed; sometimes they aren't even supporters, just unfortunates who served as an example of the stateʼs power. A popular uprising can become unpopular quickly if relatives and family members killed. Destroying the crops and livelihoods and razing the countryside leaves little for a guerrilla force trying to sustain itself. Brutality may not be pretty, but it can be extremely effective.
The United States now employs a more civilized approach to persuade citizens to deny aid and sanctuary to insurgents. The strategy of population-centric counterinsurgency (COIN) involves separating insurgents from the populace and convincing the people and the more moderate insurgents that the government represents security and an increased quality of life.
These are not new concepts; American military theorist Col. John Boyd write up the exact definition of population-centric COIN in his monograph ʻPatterns of Conflictʼ written in response to the escalating Vietnam war:
Action: Undermine guerilla cause and destroy their cohesion by demonstrating integrity and competence of government to represent and serve needs of the people - rather than exploit and impoverish them for the benefit of a greedy elite.* Take political initiative to root out and visibly punish corruption. Select new leaders with recognized competence as well as popular appeal. Ensure that they deliver justice, eliminate grievances and connect government with grass roots.* Infiltrate guerilla movement as well as employ population for intelligence about guerilla plans, operations, and organization. Seal-off guerilla regions from outside world by diplomatic, psychological, and various other activities that strip-away potential allies as well as by disrupting or straddling communications that connect these regions with the outside world.
This approach is more difficult and dangerous for security forces in the beginning, but pays dividends as the locals gain trust and begin to offer information about insurgent activities. It becomes possible to use targeted strikes and raids to harass and eliminate insurgents with minimal danger to civilians.
We have seen in Iraq and example of how this can succeed. Iraq was a complex mix of three insurgencies, the Shia militias, the Sunni Baathists and foreign Al-Qaeda elements. The groups had differing goals, allegiances and motivations, but shared a desire to expel U.S. forces, and to gain influence over the nascent Iraqi central government. Additionally, a civil war was ongoing between Sunni and Shia insurgents; longtime religious and tribal feuds turned into active, targeted kidnappings and killings.
Many factors contributed to the successes in Iraq including the Anbar Awakening, the marginalization of Moqtada al Sadr, the increasing proficiency of Iraqi security forces and a shift of United States strategy to population-centric COIN, along with the sufficient forces to do so. These factors are interconnected, and an approach focused on securing the civilian populace could have hastened them, had it been implemented earlier.
The Anbar Awakening was driven largely by a realization that the Al-Qaeda elements and Baathists were killing more Iraqis than Americans. The Sheiks came to determine that their responsibility to safeguard their people forced them to expel the foreign guerrillas and reign in those of their own who were perpetrating these outrages. A concerted effort over a number of years by U.S. forces had gained a level of trust that allowed an alliance of convenience between the tribes and the United States against the insurgents. This denied sanctuary to Al-Qaeda elements, and many former Baathist insurgents morphed into Sons of Iraq now responsible for security in their villages. Once the locals determined this was a viable and lasting situation a virtuous cycle began and they gave more intelligence on the remaining insurgents who were killed or captured. The U.S. and Iraqi forces jointly maintained security after each area was cleared. This was the key as US forces left their large bases and deployed out among the Iraqis to share their sacrifices.
As the Surge forces came into play the switch to pop-centric COIN had been made, but there were still many kinetic engagements as areas of insurgent control were entered and cleared. The difference was the U.S. forces stayed and set up alongside Iraqi security to ensure that the areas stayed safe. Local police were augmented and over time were able to become the primary guarantors of peace. In actions to clear areas controlled by Shia Militias, the Iraqi Army made some of its first major offensive operations and showed that the central government could impose its will and ensure the insurgents could not operate with impunity. The United States spent considerable time, effort and energy building, training and equipping the Iraqi forces and also that they were committed to staying long enough to quell the violence and not leave until the Iraqis could handle security themselves. When they showed they could defeat the militias in Sadr City, they achieved two things: a military victory and proof that the Shia-dominated government would fight against rogue Shia elements. This was essential to gaining the trust of Sunnis and Kurds. As more villages and cities were pacified, insurgents found fewer places to hide, and the vast majority of the country was secured.
This allowed the United States to negotiate a security agreement with the Iraqi government, pulling forces back and leaving Iraqis to provide their own security. That process is continuing, and while there are still outbursts of violence, the insurgencies are effectively defeated. Many challenges lie ahead for the country, but the strategies and tactics employed by U.S. and Iraqis, chiefly the pop-centric COIN, worked.
The question now becomes can these successes and strategies be transferred to Afghanistan. The answer: Yes, it can; quite effectively.
The basic tactics that compose a pop-centric COIN strategy remain applicable:
Safeguard the population;
Deny the insurgents safe haven;
Share sacrifices with the civilians to build rapport;
Demonstrate that the government brings security and prosperity;
The culture in Afghanistan is fiercely tribal. Each tribe must be treated as a separate country, more or less. Personal relationships take time and trust to build, but are the only way to convince the locals that the insurgents are not more powerful. Many local leaders have been killed when they cooperated with the coalition and then our forces left the area. They must be convinced that we are there to stay and will only leave once the Afghan security apparatus can keep them safe.
The scenario should play out like this:
U.S. and Afghan security forces arrive in the village and meet with tribal elders to illustrate that they are staying for the duration. Living arrangements are negotiated with an emphasis on living among the villagers. A defensible stronghold is established to be used in the event of a mass attack. The local leaders are asked what projects could improve the quality of life. Maximum interaction between the forces and the villagers is encouraged. Locals are recruited to work on civil improvement projects, and to also become part of the security apparatus. Meals, work and daily life become a shared existence; rapport is built. With that comes trust and the belief that security and prosperity come from this partnership. This grows to eclipse the fear of reprisals from the insurgents, and the idea that the government is a force for good takes hold.
As the Afghan security forces increase in number and competence, they replace U.S. forces and are augmented by locals to ensure that the insurgents cannot gain a foothold as the United States draws back.
This is not a quick solution; it is a decidedly long war initiative. But it has the advantage of diminishing violence as it progresses. Initially, there will be kinetic engagements and casualties as insurgents are pushed out of areas where they have influence. The risks are much heavier at the beginning because the locals wonʼt be as trusting or willing to help. Their support is won by showing them that the United States and the Afghan security forces value their safety. The tactics must cause as little collateral damage to the people as possible. That means accepting a greater danger to joint forces in the initial stages. But this is an investment to reap a reward: greater cooperation from the locals as they see who has their best interests at heart.
This strategy must be implemented in stages. As areas are pacified, the footprint increases. It must be done in conjunction with a major effort to recruit, train and deploy competent Afghan security forces – mostly Army and paramilitary police who can hold their own against insurgents. U.S. forces cannot garrison the entire country, but they can help clear areas, and then leave them in the hands of a combination of national and local security. Once a secure environment is created, the civilian surge must flow in. Infrastructure, health, agriculture and other quality-of-life projects must begin.
These will be what seal the deal. This must involve the State Department, USAID and NGOs, and especially agencies of the Afghan government who can safely operate in the now-secured areas. They will show that the national government is not a corrupt enterprise, but a structure to help the Afghan people. The people will then invest in the notion of a nation, creating an incentive to resist attempts by insurgents to re-infiltrate or recruit.
Many factors make this a difficult strategy to implement in a country with forbidding terrain, fractious tribal rivalries and a history of antipathy to outsiders. But if the goal is to foster a country that will not serve as a breeding ground and sanctuary for extremist violence, this is the most likely path. It will take resources, commitment and patience, and after seven years that is difficult to consider. But the alternative is to cede the battlefield and yield victory to the Taliban and Al-Qaeda – who will gain credibility, power and recruits within Afghanistan and worldwide. Which is more difficult to consider?
Authors:
John Wagner- Served in Iraq with MNF-I
Mark Seavey- Served in Afghanistan with the US Army Infantry
Jim Hanson- Conducted Counterinsurgency operations in multiple Pacific Rim
countries
October 22, 2009
(VIDEO) Counterterrorism Primer
A brief explanation of what counterterror strategy in the Af/Pak theater is, from Warrior Legacy Institute
The Layperson's Guide to Counterterror Strategy For Afghanistan & Pakistan
Via the Warrior Legacy Institute:
The Warrior Legacy Institute (WLI) is a “people's think tank” designed to take the most important national security issues and explain them in simple language to the American people. The papers are designed for those who have an interest in what our strategies actually are, but who do not have a deep knowledge of military affairs. The papers and companion videos can be found here.
The debate about what our plan for Afghanistan should be is happening now, WLI believes all Americans should have a clear understanding of the specifics under consideration.
The Warrior Legacy Institute (WLI) is a “people's think tank” designed to take the most important national security issues and explain them in simple language to the American people. The papers are designed for those who have an interest in what our strategies actually are, but who do not have a deep knowledge of military affairs. The papers and companion videos can be found here.
The debate about what our plan for Afghanistan should be is happening now, WLI believes all Americans should have a clear understanding of the specifics under consideration.
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