The First Glimmer

Richard Fernandez | Belmont Club | The New York Times writes “Al Qaeda in Iraq Scores Big”. The piece is signed by the editorial board too. It describes the negative consequences of the President’s hasty abandonment of Iraq. But more properly considered, it is an indictment of a whole strategy. For the consequences of that failed plan are rippling not just through Iraq, but North Africa, Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan and Syria. Before the end the consequences may spread to Turkey and Saudi Arabia.

Iraq is a sovereign country, responsible for its own security. But Iraq might have been better able to repel Al Qaeda if Mr. Maliki and the Americans had worked harder on a deal to keep a token number of troops in the country to continue helping with training and intelligence-gathering. Not surprising, Mr. Maliki’s interest in such an arrangement has grown; Army Special Operations and the C.I.A. reportedly have small units in the country to assist in counterterrorism activities.

Well let’s not forget the breakouts in Libya or Pakistan either. That last paragraph– “but Iraq might have been better able to repel Al Qaeda if Mr. Maliki and the Americans had worked harder on a deal to keep a token number of troops in the country to continue helping with training and intelligence-gathering ” –  is probably as close to eating crow as anything recently published by the Gray Lady. Time to re-excerpt my old post, the Ten Ships, published in May, 2010, which if read, might have made the NYT’s surprise and astonishment at the burgeoning disaster less.

READ MORE

Al Qaeda in Iraq Scores Big

New York Times | The Editorial Board | July 29, 2013 - Jailbreaks are common in Iraq, but the brazen assaults on the prisons at Abu Ghraib and Taji last week are in a class by themselves. The attacks freed perhaps as many as 800 militants, who are now sought by Interpol as a “major threat” to global security. The attacks showed the fearsome and growing strength of Al Qaeda in Iraq, seemingly on the decline only a few years ago. They also raised new questions about the effectiveness of Iraq’s authoritarian prime minister, Nuri Kamal al-Maliki, as well as the stability of Iraq itself.

READ MORE

Attacks at Prisons Raise Worries of al-Qaeda’s Strength in Iraq

Michael R. Gordon and Duraid Adnan  | The Globe and Mail | Last updated Wednesday, Jul. 24 2013, 8:39 PM EDT | WASHINGTON — The brazen assaults on two prisons in Iraq this week were significant not only for the hundreds of prisoners who were freed but also for what they indicate about the growing capabilities of al-Qaeda’s Iraq affiliate, U.S. officials and experts outside government said on Tuesday.

The attacks on the prisons at Abu Ghraib and Taji were carefully synchronized operations in which members of the al-Qaeda affiliate used mortars to pin down Iraqi forces, employed suicide bombers to punch holes in their defences and then sent an assault force to free the prison’s inmates, Western experts said.

READ MORE

Al Qaeda Affiliates Reemerge in Iraq, U.S. Influence Wanes

AWR Hawkins | Big Peace | Military experts are warning members of Congress that the reemergence of Al Qaeda affiliates in Iraq and elsewhere are undoing U.S. gains and undercutting U.S. influence.

Lt. Col. Anthony Shaffer told Fox News, "We left Iraq on the edge of being stable [in 2011]," but now, "Al Qaeda as an entity is coming back strong within the region and is doing things to destabilize governments, which, at this point in time, are still friendly to us."

On July 25, Iraq's parliament speaker Osama al-Nujaifi concurred: "The situation is grave."

READ MORE

2013 Iraq Update #22: Iraq's sectarian crisis reignites as Shi'a militias execute civilians and remobilize

By Jessica Lewis, Ahmed Ali, and Kimberly Kagan of the Institute for the Study of War

View our 2013 Iraq Updates online. 

Escalating violence in Iraq crossed a new and very dangerous threshold this week.  Al Qaeda in Iraq launched a concentrated wave of car-bomb and other attacks specifically against civilian Shi'a targets in and around Baghdad.  Shi'a militias are mobilizing and have begun a round of sectarian killings facilitated by false checkpoints, a technique characteristic of the 2006-2007 period.  Prime Minister Nuri al Maliki has taken a number of steps to demonstrate that he remains in control of the situation.  The expansion of Shi'a militia activity, however, is likely to persuade many Iraqis that he is either not in control or is actively abetting the killings.  The re-mobilization of Shi'a militias in Iraq coincides with the formal announcement by Lebanese Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah of his organization's active military participation in the Syrian civil war.  Al Qaeda in Iraq's sectarian mass-murder attacks coincide with the announcement by AQI's affiliate in Syria, Jabhat al Nusra, that attacking Hezbollah is that group's primary target henceforth.  The stage appears to be set not merely for the collapse of the Iraqi state into the kind of vicious sectarian killing and sectarian cleansing that nearly destroyed it in 2006 and 2007, but also for the expansion of that sectarian warfare throughout both Mesopotamia and the Levant.

Sectarian violence has escalated sharply in Iraq. On Monday, May 27, al-Qaeda in Iraq conducted a coordinated operation to target Shi‘a neighborhoods in Baghdad with numerous and large vehicle-borne explosive devices (VBIEDs). This operation followed a wave of VBIED attacks on May 20 that targeted the lines of communication into Baghdad and some Shi‘a populations across Iraq. An estimated 212 people have died in violent attacks in Iraq since May 20, and another 624 have been injured. May’s casualties are thus likely to surpass April’s, which had made that month the most violent in Iraq since 2008. Most of these attacks, especially VBIEDs and suicide attacks, conform to the methods usually attributed to AQI. Additional reports from Baghdad and Diyala also indicate that Shi‘a militant groups, including the Iranian-backed Sadrist splinter group Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq, have begun to mobilize in Iraq to establish checkpoints in Baghdad and to conduct extra-judicial killings (EJKs) against Sunnis. Extra-judicial killings reportedly carried out by militias also occurred in the city of Hilla in central Iraq. AAH, along with Lebanese Hezbollah and Kata’ib Hezbollah, publically acknowledged its military involvement in Syria in April 2013. Lebanese Hezbollah has mobilized in Syria throughout May. This regional military activation, as well as the elevated threat to the Iraqi Shi‘a population posed by AQI, lends greater credibility to the reports that Iraqi Shi‘a militant groups have mobilized to conduct intimidation and violence against Sunni in the name of defending Shi’a populations.

AQI’s 2013 VBIED Campaign

Violent attacks by al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) escalated sharply in April and May. AQI has maneuvered among anti-government protests and Iraqi Security Force deployments to project attacks throughout Iraq, most prominently in Baghdad, Salah ad-Din, and Ninewa Provinces. Vehicle-borne improvised-explosive devices (VBIEDs) are re-emerging as a primary attack type, reverting to a trend first seen as the sectarian civil war expanded in 2006. In particular, the two waves of VBIED attacks on May 20 and May 27 demonstrate a concerted effort by AQI to exacerbate sectarian tensions and escalate violence, to fix Iraqi security forces in certain positions and drive them from others, to gain freedom of movement along lines of communication, and to set conditions for deliberate targeting of neighborhoods that were prime locations for sectarian violence in 2006-7. AQI conducted a campaign in July 2012 (under the banner of the Islamic State of Iraq) that focused on Iraqi government officials, security forces, Sahwa (Awakening) leaders, and Shi‘a civilians in order to limit the reach and effectiveness of Maliki’s government and to regain lost territory. Since that time, AQI has conducted attacks using IEDs, suicide bombers, armed clashes, assassinations, and coordinated simultaneous explosions.  The recent waves differ both in the number of VBIEDs used simultaneously and in the specific targeting of Shi’a civilians in known sectarian hot-spots.

The concentration of VBIED attacks in late May 2013 demonstrates AQI’s capacity to stage in the locations around the outskirts of Baghdad (the Baghdad belt) from which it had launched attacks in 2006-7, to procure the components necessary to build VBIEDs in large numbers, and to project force into Shi‘a communities and mixed areas within Baghdad. Moreover, the campaign has deliberately escalated violence and selected targets to shape not only the perceptions of Iraqi Sunnis, but also those of Iraqi Shi‘a, who may begin to lose faith in the Maliki government if attacks are allowed to continue.

GRAPHIC 1 | VBIED ATTACKS IN BAGHDAD, 20 AND 27 MAY 2013

Wave of VBIED attacks: May 20

A wave of 11 VBIED attacks and seven additional explosions struck urban centers across Iraq on Monday, May 20 resulting in at least 60 deaths and 178 injuries. Two other VBIEDs were defused before they could explode on their targets. Six of the VBIEDs detonated in predominantly Shi‘a neighborhoods along the periphery of Baghdad city. These events, depicted on the map above, accounted for a small percentage of the total casualties on that day, yielding one death and 21 injuries. The low casualties may indicate AQI’s difficulty entering Shi‘a neighborhoods to hit prime targets. In light of the wave of attacks a week later that did hit such targets, however, it is more likely that AQI was using the first series of attacks to establish access routes into Baghdad and test its ability to synchronize operations. The neighborhoods chosen represent the outer rim of Shi‘a communities in Baghdad that are most easily accessible from main supply routes and proximate Sunni neighborhoods. The attacks collectively illustrate a campaign to attack a very selective target set just inside the city rim.

Other VBIEDs on May 20 in the cities of Basra, Mahmoudiyah, Wasit, Hilla, Balad, Samarra, and Baiji, accounted for the majority of the casualties. The most lethal attack occurred in Hilla city, Babel Province, where two car bombs exploded in a market near the Shi’a Wardiya mosque, killing 22 and wounding 77. Targeting of religious sites clearly indicates AQI’s intent to elicit a sectarian response, particularly given the centrality of the Samarra mosque bombing in 2006 to the subsequent mobilization of Shi‘a  militias for sectarian combat. Additionally, the car bomb in Balad on May 20 targeted a bus full of Iranian pilgrims bound for the Shrine of Imam Mohammed, leaving four dead and 10 wounded. This incident, along with another attack on Iranian pilgrims at the Samarra mosque on May 25, feed into the justifications being proffered by Shi’a fighting groups in support of their activities.  Key figures within Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq have used these attacks recently as rallying cries to defend holy sites. Iran has also responded to previous attacks by launching probes into the deaths of pilgrims in Iraq. Iran’s Director General of the Hajj and Pilgrimage Organization in charge of Holy Sites Masoud Akhavan announced in December 2012 that Iranian security companies were escorting Iranian pilgrims into Iraq. This practice may also be a vehicle by which Iran could funnel IRGC-QF augmentation into Iraq, for which there is historical precedent.  It also explains AQI’s focused targeting of these pilgrims.

Comparing the VBIED attacks on May 20 to concurrent attacks using improvised explosive devices (IED) and adhesive explosive devices (AED), the VBIEDs were used to target large numbers of civilians, while IEDs and AEDs were often used for targeted killings or attacks against security force patrols or members of the Sahwa (Awakening). The Samarra VBIED on May 20 targeted Sahwa as they gathered to receive their salaries. VBIEDs have also been used in 2013 to target ISF at security checkpoints, but in May 2013 they have largely been used to target Shi‘a civilians.

Wave of VBIED attacks: May 27

Two days after Iraqi security forces moved to conduct operations in western Anbar, AQI launched a second wave of 13 VBIEDS and one additional explosion on May 27 that killed 36 and wounded 147. This time, all 14 attacks occurred in the vicinity of Baghdad, indicating a deliberate shift to focus upon the capital region. Within Baghdad, the map above demonstrates a geographic shift from the periphery to the center, in particular to neighborhoods at the heart of the sectarian strife in 2006-7 such as Saadoun (in Rusafa), Khadimiya, Huriya, Saadriya (in central Karkh), and Shaab (just outside of Sadr City). Attacks in Habbibiyah in Sadr City may also be meant to show the government and Shi‘a militant groups that AQI can attack even into the heart of their territory.

AQI’s ability to plan and execute 13 simultaneous VBIED attacks at strategically selected sites within Baghdad is also noteworthy. VBIEDs are among the most expensive and complex improvised weapons systems, capable of achieving massive effects in isolation, and often historically reserved for that purpose. The use of so many VBIEDs in a single day demonstrates a high degree of technical and organizational skill and suggests the ability to produce VBIEDs in large numbers and rapidly.  It indicates the dramatic extent to which AQI appears to have recovered from the defeats inflicted on it in 2007 and 2008.

AQI attacks did not slow after May 27, moreover. Attacks have continued over the last three days, including six more VBIEDs in the vicinity of Baghdad, and one in particular against a wedding in Jihad on May 30 that claimed 20 casualties. Jihad is another predominantly Shi‘a neighborhood in southwestern Baghdad that was heavily contested in 2006-7, and sufficiently Shi’ified through migrations and extra-judicial killings that it supported Moqtada al Sadr in the Baghdad Uprising in 2008. This attack occurred one day after a VBIED attack in the market of Jihad, which killed 16 and wounded 45. Cumulatively, these two events claimed the greatest number of casualties over the last ten days.

Shi‘a Militant Response
The recent bombing waves in Baghdad have gripped residents with fear of sectarian war. Their sentiments are reminiscent of the atmosphere that engulfed the city in 2006 as broader conflict loomed.  As a result of the deteriorating security in Baghdad, commercial activity in the city has been declining.   Social media posts and isolated reports have been circulating since the beginning of the week that Iraqi Shi‘a militias, primarily Asai’b Ahl Al-Haq (AAH), have been patrolling streets of Baghdad, setting up “false checkpoints,” and conducting extra-judicial killings against Sunnis. Residents have been expressing fear of extra-judicial killings since early May. The evidence is clear; Shi’a militants have mobilized in Baghdad and are conducting executions of civilians.

                                                      

GRAPHIC 2 | SHI'A MILITANT ATTACKS IN BAGHDAD IN MAY 2013

Several attacks over recent days bore the signature of Shi’a militant groups. On 28 May, the bodies of two university students were found in northern Baghdad in Agarguf area of the Mansour District with hands bound behind them, shot in the chest and head. They had been thrown from an unmarked vehicle according to witnesses who also noted that false checkpoints had been set up in the same area. Agarguf area was used by Shi’a militant groups to dump hundreds of bodies in 2007. Three people had been kidnapped by armed persons in an unmarked vehicle on the evening of 26 May at al-Mu’atham bus stop in central Baghdad, which is frequently used by students. It is possible that these events, both involving signature tactics of Shi’a militant groups, had the same victims. Additionally, on 26 May, armed persons wearing police uniforms invaded a home in al-Za’franiya in southeast Baghdad, dragging the owner outside and shooting him. The method of attack and geographic location correspond with historical patterns of Shi’a militancy and make attribution to Sunni terrorist groups implausible. Sunni mosques were also attacked in the Baghdad neighborhoods of Mansour and Saydiyah and twice in Diyala province, which clearly points to Shi‘a militancy.

Morality policing executions have also been reported in areas of Baghdad just outside of Sadr City. On 14 May, unidentified armed men attacked a police checkpoint in Zayunah, handcuffing security personnel but leaving them unharmed. Afterwards, the same gunmen traveling in an SUV raided five liquor stores and killed 12 people. A week later, on 22 May, unidentified armed men attacked a brothel in Zayunah and killed five men, five women, the owner, and his wife with silenced weapons and knives. Also on 22 May, unidentified armed men travelling in a car shot a liquor shop owner while driving near a market in al-Shaab, in northeast Baghdad. Zayuna and al-Shaab are predominantly Shi’a neighborhoods, and militia activity there most likely indicates the militia’s intent to re-establish control.

Additionally, several assassinations this week fit patterns of violence historically characteristic of Shi’a militant groups. On 26 May, the imam of the al-Qadisiyah Mosque was attacked by unidentified armed men with silenced weapons while driving in Diyala Province. The same day, unidentified armed individuals shot a policeman in al-Waziriyah, in the northeast quadrant of Baghdad, again using silenced weapons, and a primary school teacher was killed with silenced weapons in al-Qahirah, a neighboring area in the northeast of Baghdad. On 27 May, another teacher was shot with silenced weapons near the militia stronghold of Khalis in Diyala. Additionally, in an assassination that drew more public attention to this rise in targeted killings, Abbas Ja’far, the brother of a famous soccer player, was shot on 25 May by two armed men on a motorcycle outside his home in Habibiyah, a neighborhood in eastern Baghdad abutting Sadr City. Two other attacks involved drive-by shootings of civilians in Jisr Diyala in southeast Baghdad, one a civilian as he was leaving his home, and another the owner of a grocery store. Other variants of these militia signature attacks included the killing of four civilians as they exited a taxi in al-Kadhimiyah, north of Baghdad, and the killing of two owners of a goldsmith shop in al-Mashtal, on the rim of southeast Baghdad. Some of these instances clearly demonstrate sectarian violence because they hit obviously Sunni targets. Others, in predominantly Shi’a areas of Baghdad, instead demonstrate intra-Shi’a violence.

Other attacks likely conducted by Iraqi Shi‘a militias can be detected by method and by target. The most recent target set has included cafés, where larger groups congregate. They include an improvised explosive device (IED) attack on a café in the western Baghdad neighborhood of Ameriya on April 18 that killed 27 people. Another café attack took place in Baghdad in the nearby Jamia neighborhood on May 5 (killing or wounding 15 people) and another on May 29 in the Hib Hib area in Diyala province that resulted in 22 people killed and wounded. While these attacks have not been clearly attributed, they differ from attacks customarily attributed to AQI, such as car bombs, suicide bombings, and attacks against Iraqi Shi‘a targets. These attacks all took place in predominantly Iraqi Sunni locales. In four of them, IEDs were used; in the fifth, the attack on the Ihsan mosque in Mansour, was conducted by hand grenades. On May 31, police sources in Babil revealed that gunmen killed four people in Hilla. The sources describe the gunmen as traveling with impunity and using silenced weapons, killing former members of the Baath party and one shop owner in Hilla—again, hallmarks of Shi’a militia rather than AQI activity. This comes one week after the VBIED attack upon a Shi’a mosque there.

It is conceivable that AQI has conducted these attacks to instigate retaliatory violence. Their divergence from AQI’s attack methods and their locations, however, make it much more likely that they are reprisal attacks by Shi‘a militant groups. The widespread perception among the public that Shi’a militias conducted these attacks is a major driver and amplifier of fear among the population.

AAH has been in the in the spotlight of renewed militant and political activities since April 2013. The group itself confirmed its role and participation in military activities in Syria along with other Shi‘a groups. Moreover, and in a major projection of force and political prominence, AAH organized a massive, campaign-style rally in Baghdad on May 4. The event was held in a government-owned soccer stadium in Baghdad, the Sina’a Club Stadium on the border of Sadr City, and was ostensibly to celebrate the 10^th anniversary of the group. Members of the Iraqi Council of Representatives are reported to have attended. Photos of the gathering reveal the presence of AAH’s senior leadership, parades, large attendance, tribal figures, and sophisticated organizational capabilities. During the event, AAH’s intentions and capabilities for increased activity were made clear. AAH leader, Qais Al-Khazali, called on members of “the resistance across the spectrum” to maintain readiness and warned politicians who are connected to “regional agendas” that they will be pursued regardless of whether they are “in fortified areas, secured hotels, or armored vehicles.” The resistance is the title used by AAH to describe itself, as well as the word Iranian and Lebanese Hezbollahi leaders use referring to the “axis of resistance” against Israel and its allies. Al-Khazali also urged anti-government protesters to refrain from sectarian slogans and to reject the killing of ISF members. Those statements came under attack by some Iraqi politicians who also condemned the government for allowing the event to happen. AAH ability to hold events in government-owned facilities is attributed to its relations with Maliki. He has welcomed them into the political process and views them as a countervailing force against the Sadrist Trend, led by Muqtada Al-Sadr, from which the group split in 2004.

Spread of “false checkpoints”

Since 2007, Baghdad’s security procedures have incorporated a vast network of street checkpoints manned by Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) members. The purpose of those checkpoints is to look for car bombs and capture wanted individuals. Reports describing “false checkpoints” suggest that some are not manned by ISF members, but instead by personnel in civilian clothes who may or not be security officials. Reportedly, these checkpoints have been inspecting identification cards and inquiring about the sectarian affiliation of passengers. There are also reports that the militias have kidnapped and killed people based on their identity and that the targeting has primarily been of Iraqi Sunnis. The areas where those checkpoints are reported to have operated are concentrated in western Baghdad, which has neighborhoods that are mixed between Iraqi Shi‘a and Iraqi Sunnis.

This way of operating closely echoes events in 2006-7, during which Shi’a militia groups established checkpoints in Baghdad at which they stopped cars, checked identification cards, and kidnapped and then executed Sunnis. They manned those checkpoints either in militia garb or dressed as Iraqi Security Forces. In 2006, the ISF was infiltrated by these militias and tolerated such checkpoints within sight of their official locations or operated them.

Further reports surfaced on May 30 detailing that individuals in civilian clothes have been present at multiple official Baghdad checkpoints; the Iraqi Ministry of the Interior described the individuals as “belonging to formation within the Ministry of Interior.” The MoI spokesperson added that the ministry relies on members from intelligence or other departments who are sometimes tasked with verifying identification cards. According to the same report and citing an unnamed senior security source, militias have been active in both the Rusafa and Karkh sections of Baghdad, but the report asserted that talks of false checkpoints are "exaggerated and intended to spread an atmosphere of fear among citizens.” Despite the explanation offered by MoI, the presence of civilian-clothed individuals is bound to stoke the fears of populations that encounter such checkpoints. It may, indeed, feed speculation that the MoI has become re-infiltrated by militias or is itself engaging in sectarian violence.

Allegations of militia reactivation in Baghdad have been emerging since early May. On May 8, just four days after the AAH parade in the soccer stadium, Iraqiyya issued a statement condemning the government for tolerating rhetoric and threats from Iraqi Shi‘a militias, including AAH, Kata’ib Hizballah (KH), and the Mokhtar Army (an Iraqi Hezbollah unit which was formed in February 2013). Iraqiyya posited that statements from these militias are “directly or indirectly tied to those events that resulted in the death of innocent youth.” Iraqiyya may have been referring to increased attacks on cafes where youth congregate.

On May 21, Muqtada Al-Sadr, issued a statement in which he urged followers to “ostracize extremism and what is issued from some of those who belong to Wahhabism or what is issued by some Shi‘a militias.” With this statement, Sadr attempted to take the middle ground in condemning Sunni extremist groups while also criticizing Shi‘a groups. Sadr’s critique of groups like AAH is natural. They are rivals and they compete over turf in Baghdad and elsewhere in southern Iraq. Their rivalry is two-fold, as the leader of AAH, Qais al-Khazali, views himself as the heir to Sadr’s father Ayatollah Mohammed Sadiq Al-Sadr. Muqtada al-Sadr stands to lose if AAH mobilizes while the Sadrist Trend does not. AAH is also the Sadrists’ primary political, military, and increasingly social competitor; this competition is very likely to continue in the future.

The Iraqi government has made a number of announcements to reassure the public and assuage its fears. The cabinet announced on May 28 that it will “pursue all types of militias and firmly strike anybody who violates public order.” Additionally, Prime Minister Nouri Al-Maliki visited the areas in western Baghdad where most militia activities are reported to have taken place. He inspected checkpoints in Jihad, Amriyya, Mansour, Adel, Huriyya, Kadhimiyah, Taji, and Al-Adhamiyah on May 29. His deputy, Saleh Al-Mutlaq, visited the Saydiyah area on the same day. These are the mixed areas where much of the sectarian violence occurred in 2006-7 and where the public is most concerned about militia activities. The Ministry of Interior (MoI) denied the presence of false checkpoints and urged citizens to contact authorities with information regarding their presence. The Baghdad Operations Center, which absorbed ISF headquarters in Rusafa (East Baghdad) and Karkh (West Baghdad) last week, announced a travel ban for all unregistered vehicles starting at 0600 on Friday, May 31.  Vehicles without license plates have been cited in reports of kidnapping and executions.

Maliki has recently ordered a major shift of key leaders across the security sector, ostensibly in response to heightened security concerns. Those major changes may signal his lack of confidence in their leadership for the security of Baghdad. The leadership changes might also have been a prerequisite for moving trusted leaders into vital positions in the provinces, where Maliki had begun to conduct more aggressive offensive operations after the Hawija incident. Such a hypothesis would seem more plausible if former trusted leaders emerge in new positions, and some of them have. It is also likely that Maliki’s recent restructure of Iraqi Security Force leadership heralds a new security strategy for Baghdad. It is not clear what new strategy he might have intended, but he has at this point either tolerated the mobilization of militias or lost control of their activities in Baghdad.

The possible reactivation of militias poses a serious challenge for him as a security breakdown in Baghdad will be seen as a major setback to ISF and the prime minister. Maliki has hitherto been able to isolate Baghdad from the protesting provinces. The large range of AQI and the reemergence of the militias links the violence in the capital and the provinces in ways he will not likely control. In that light, Maliki’s strategic embrace of AAH in 2012 in order to limit Muqtada al-Sadr’s influence may backfire in 2013. Muqtada may be marginalized, but so too may be Maliki.

And there is evidence that Muqtada is losing control of his militias as well.  In a significant development, a  member of the Sadrist trend office in Mahmudiyah organized a parade. The date of the parade is not known but on May 30 Muqtada Al-Sadr warned his followers to refrain from any action “that reignites sectarianism” and declared that organizing parades is his sole responsibility.  He further disowned the actions of the organizer, Karim Al-Araji, and stated that Araji acted independently. The Mahmudiyah event carries a number of implications. It is a mixed area in the Baghdad belt and since 2006 has continued to be on the fault line of sectarian tensions. The parade suggests that, with reports emerging about militia activation, organizers perceived a need to project force to compete with reported activities by AAH. They may have acted independently of Sadr’s control but his statement demonstrates that he is concerned about ceding ground to AAH’s mobilization. For AAH, discontented members of the Sadrist trend would be prime recruitment targets that could significantly enhance the capabilities of the group.     

For its part, AAH has denied involvement in operations in Baghdad. Its spokesperson, Ahmed Al-Kanani, stated with regard to false checkpoints that AAH “in cooperation with the security apparatus investigated the news of a false checkpoint in Al-Liqa Square in Iskan and other areas in Baghdad, but did not find any trace of them.” AAH’s political bureau chief, Adnan Faihan Al-Dulaimi added on May 30 that the group is not involved in any activities, but warned that the current conditions are similar to the ones that appeared in 2006. Al-Dulaimi emphasized that AAH “is ready for it [mobilization] and we are ready to protect our people.”

Despite the withdrawal of U.S. forces and AAH’s ostensible transition to a socio-religious and political role, AAH has remained an active militant group that did not disarm. Moreover, as the group has been playing an active role in the Abu Al-Fadhel Al-Abbas Brigade (AFAB) in Syria, with responsibility to protect the Sayyida Zeinab shrine in Damascus, AAH has been activated for battle since 2012. This mobilization for Syria reduces the obstacles to taking up arms in Iraq.

AAH has overtly linked the conflict in Syria to the one in Iraq. According to AAH’s political deputy Al-Dulaimi, “The Sayyeda Zeinab shrine has had symbolic importance for Muslims all over the world and the targeting of this shrine by Takfiri extremists will result in a disaster, because an attack on it will be followed by a similar attack on the Imam Askari shrine in Samarra. An attack on the Imam Askari shrine in Samarra will inflame the sectarian crisis in Iraq.” The line of argument serves AAH well by justifying mobilization in both Syria and Iraq.

Dulaimi stated in the same interview that “[AAH] is alongside Iraq’s security forces and emphasizes the existing political process in this country.” With the escalation of attacks by AQI, it is also increasingly likely that AAH and other Iraqi Shi‘a militant groups will perceive the need to defend predominately Iraqi Shi‘a areas throughout Iraq; and in Baghdad especially. Attacks against Iraqi civilians have continued despite the efforts of Iraqi Security Forces to contain them. In 2006, when ISF was unable to contain the civil war in Baghdad and Diyala, Iraqi Shi‘a militant groups mobilized to provide protection. Although the ISF's capabilities have vastly improved since 2006, the continuation of AQI attacks in Baghdad will reduce the confidence of the population and set conditions for the return of Iraqi Shi‘a militias as defenders of the Shi’a.

AAH mobilization in Baghdad comes as other Iranian-backed groups have increased their involvement in the Syrian conflict. Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah made two visits to Tehran in April, the first to meet with IRGC-Qods Force Commander Qassem Suleimani and the second to meet Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei. Afterwards, Nasrallah admitted his fighters’ involvement in Syria, announced that “Hezbollah could become more deeply involved in the future,” and said that Syria had “real friends” who would aid it. He further stated that there would be “very serious repercussions” if the shrine of Sayyida Zeinab was destroyed or damaged. This announcement was concurrent with Hezbollah’s sending of numerous reinforcements, probably more than two thousand, to assist regime forces in besieging the strategically important town of Qusayr.

In Qusayr, Hezbollah met fierce resistance, with estimates of over 50 militants killed in action between May 18-21. On May 24, 75 fighters had been reported killed to that point in the month. The next day, Nasrallah officially signaled his “undying loyalty” to the Syrian regime; this shift in rhetoric is notable, from a commitment primarily to defending Lebanese civilians in Syria and religious sites using veiled language to an explicit and overt commitment to defending the Syrian regime.

Compounding Hezbollah’s official commitment to the ongoing Syrian civil war, the group has come into direct conflict with Sunni-oriented extremist elements. Jabhat al-Nusra, the al-Qaeda affiliated rebel organization, announced on May 15 that targeting Hezbollah would be their top priority. Jabhat al-Nusra has also clashed with the Abu Fadl al-Abbas (AFAB) brigade, which is a Shi‘a Syrian militant group affiliated AAH. AFAB and AAH, like Hezbollah, are all Iranian-linked militant organizations. This signals a broadening conflict between Sunni and Shi‘a militant groups expanding across the Iraqi and Syrian fronts.

Iraqis, and particularly the people of Baghdad, have proven resilient in the face of violence since 2008, but their reaction to increased attacks and the news of Iraqi Shi‘a militias resurgence indicate genuine concern. The overt mobilization of Iraqi Shi‘a militias has already included: public military parades, increased inflammatory and threatening rhetoric, leaflets and night letters dropped demanding the departure of Iraqi Sunnis, assassination of local Sunni clerics, and possible retaliatory attacks that target Iraqi Sunni areas. If AAH has mobilized, other Iraqi Shi‘a militias like KH and Sadr’s Promised Day Brigade will feel pressured to take part in order to burnish their credentials as protectors of the Iraqi Shi‘a, which could escalate quickly to sectarian war, not only in Iraq, but throughout the region.

 

Al Qaeda in Iraq claims 'storming' operation in Baghdad

The Long War Journal | Bill Ardolino and Bill Roggio | Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) claimed credit for last week's deadly suicide assault on the Justice Ministry in Baghdad that killed 22 Iraqis. Seven Iraqi policemen and 15 civilians were killed in the March 14 attack. AQI claimed the "storming" operation, as it refers to such offensives, in a statement that was released yesterday on jihadist Internet forums. The statement was obtained and translated by the SITE Intelligence Group. The operation began with "storming the main entrance of the ministry with an explosives-laden vehicle driven by" a suicide bomber. Al Qaeda in Iraq claimed that the attack disoriented and disabled the Iraqi security forces guarding the compound, allowing the main assault team of four heavily armed fighters to attack a secondary gate, breach the defenses, and enter the ministry. (READ MORE)

Friday's Protests Will Gauge Direction of Iraqi Crisis- 2013 Iraq Update #5

By Stephen Wicken and Sam Wyer | The Iraqi Army’s fatal shooting of eight anti-government protesters in Fallujah on Friday, January 25, has increased fears that violence will escalate further. Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki has attempted to use a combination of concession and repression to deescalate tensions and gradually force the reduction of anti-government protests.
The Iraqi Ministry of Defense, for example, quickly opened an investigation into the Fallujah shooting. The army also withdrew from Fallujah to avoid further confrontations with angry protesters or radical elements. Maliki then held a joint security meeting with provincial security officials in order to stress the Iraqi Government’s “keenness to deal positively with the demonstrations and the demonstrators.” Meanwhile, the head of the committee tasked with addressing demonstrators’ demands, Deputy Prime Minister Hussein al-Shahristani, announced on January 29 that the government would increase the salaries of around 41,000 members of the Sahwa movement. The move is likely aimed at discouraging Sunni tribesmen from joining or supporting al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI).

Maliki has also begun to move against the tribal leaders who have assumed leadership of the protest movement, however. Maliki was reported to have removed the security detail of prominent Anbari Sheikh Ahmed Abu Risha on January 30. In response, the Council of Anbar Tribes pledged to protect Abu Risha in the absence of government protection. Then on January 31, an Iraqi Army force—reportedly deployed from Baghdad—arrested Sheikh Meshaal Nawaf al-Hassan and his two sons in Tikrit. Hassan is thought to be a strong supporter and prominent organizer of the Salah ad-Din protests.

Sunni tribal leaders largely have refrained from calling for a violent reaction to the Fallujah incidents, and many have urged restraint. It is possible that Abu Risha and Dulaimi tribal leader Ali Hatem al-Suleiman are awaiting Maliki’s response to the former’s ultimatum that the government turn over the troops responsible for killing protesters in Fallujah within seven days – a deadline that would expire this coming weekend. Various Iraqi tribal representatives held a Conference of Iraqi Unity in Najaf  on January 28,in which they called for the rejection of sectarianism, the release of uncharged detainees, the unity of Iraq, and the de-escalation of the tension in Anbar. The possibility remains, however, that tribal leaders are quietly mobilizing forces in anticipation of further clashes.  (READ MORE)

BREAKING NEWS!

Via Reuters UK:

Iraqi insurgent leader reportedly captured

BAGHDAD (Reuters) - Abu Omar al-Baghdadi, the purported leader of the Islamic State of Iraq, an al-Qaeda-linked insurgent group, has been captured, Iraqi state television said on Thursday.

The insurgent group is one of a handful of Sunni Arab extremist groups blamed for suicide bombings and other attacks in the northern city of Mosul and other parts of Iraq.

Violence has dropped sharply since the height of sectarian killings in 2006-07, but attacks continue. The report came on the same day that two separate suicide bombings killed 68 people in Baghdad and in a town northeast of the Iraqi capital.

Al-Iraqiya television said Baghdadi was believed to have been captured in eastern Baghdad. Security experts have previously speculated that Baghdadi was a character invented by some extremist groups rather than a real person.

U.S. Major-General David Perkins, spokesman for U.S. forces in Iraq, told Reuters Television in Washington the U.S. military had not yet been able to confirm the capture of the insurgent leader, whose detention has been reported before.

Iraqi forces are taking greater responsibility for security in Iraq as U.S. troops, who now number close to 140,000 in Iraq, prepare to withdraw fully by the end of 2011.

(Editing by Jon Boyle)

As some are wont to say....developing.

About These So Called Torture Memos...

For reference:
John McCain was tortured by the North Vietnamese.

Khalid Sheik Mohammed was not tortured by the CIA. In fact he gained weight and thrived while in confinement at GITMO.

To the left: You keep using that word, TORTURE, I don't think it means what you think it means.....

The Insurgency in Iraq - Who Are They?

A short primer on the Insurgent Groups operating in Iraq.

Source material from MNF-Iraq, Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism; SITE Institute; International Crisis Group. Accurate as of July 15, 2008


The insurgency in Iraq consists of myriad anti-Iraqi Forces and their supporters who are engaged in guerilla warfare against Coalition and Iraqi security forces and use terrorism to strike fear in the Iraqi populace. Their tactics include, but are not limited to, suicide bombings, improvised explosive device attacks, kidnapping, rudimentary sniper techniques, mortar attack, rocket attacks, and murder.

Insurgent activity is centered in the Sunni-dominated parts of Iraq, primarily the areas to the northwest of Baghdad and between the cities of Tikrit, Ramadi, Samarra and Fallujah. Sunni Arabs, including Ba’athist and former elements of Saddam Hussein’s regime, Saddamists, sometimes collaborate with international Sunni Arab terrorist networks, providing funds and guidance across family, tribal, religious and peer group lines. The foreigners include jihadists led by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi’s terrorist network, al-Qaida in Iraq, AQI. Together, these groups work to perpetuate a reign of terror designed to breed havoc in Iraq.

Some of these anti-government elements are clearly groups drawn from the former regime, the Ba’th Party, the paramilitary Fedayeen, and the Republican Guard. Some are anti-Saddam nationalist groups with no desire to see Saddam restored but resentful of U.S. and Western presence; others are Islamist groups, some members of which have been trained overseas or are foreign nationals, the latter including Syrians, Saudis, Yemenis, and Sudanese. Some activities have been the work of criminals or criminal organizations, large numbers of criminals being released at the end of the war and some certainly hiring themselves out for attacks on Coalition forces.

Other Iraqi jihadists groups are active, notably Ansar al-Sunnah, which operates primarily in Kurdish-dominated northern Iraq. The foreign jihadists enter Iraq from Saudi Arabia, Syria, Jordan, and Iran.

Most of the victims of jihadists suicide bombings have been civilians, innocent bystanders. This has been especially true since Coalition and Iraqi security forces developed tactics and deployed better equipment to protect themselves from the attacks. Among the Sunnis, a variety of groups have been identified. They are united only in the sense of having what have been called “negative” goals in opposition to U.S. presence; in seeking some return to the former status quo in which the Sunni minority have exercised power since the Ottoman period.

There are also armed militias attached to the two main Shiite political parties, the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq and al-Dawa, and there is clearly potential for Shiite participation in violence. The pattern of Iraqi activity thus far looks remarkably similar to that in Palestine with roadside bombs, which have also been used by Hezbollah in Lebanon, and other so-called improvised explosive devices; ambushes of soft-skinned vehicles; opportunistic rocket-propelled grenade and shooting attacks on military personnel; attacks on civilian members of the Coalition authorities and foreign personnel working in some way for the Coalition; attacks on Iraqi “collaborators,” most recently police and army recruits’ and attacks on economic targets such as power stations, oil installations, and pipelines. There has also been an increase in the number of attacks upon “soft” targets, principally civilian gatherings.

Terrorist Organizations
al-Qaida Organization in the Land of the Two Rivers
Mujahideen Shura Council
Ansar al-Sunnah
Islamic Army in Iraq

Although some named terrorist groups operate in Iraq, these categories are constantly shifting. The following is a brief introduction to some of the most well-known terrorist groups in Iraq.

A. al-Qaida Organization in the Land of the Two Rivers (al-Qaida in Iraq—AQI)

Al-Qaida Organization in the Land of the Two Rivers (AQI) is the name of the terrorist group led by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi before being killed in a Coalition forces airstrike on June 7, 2006.
Abu Ayyub al-Masri replaced al-Zarqawi as leader of the group whose name implies that they consider themselves as the center of Jihadist activities in Iraq.

The goals of this group are to overthrow the Iraqi government and establish an Islamic state in Iraq by forcing out the U.S.-led coalition. Elements of the Kurdish Islamist group Ansar al-Islam, and indigenous Sunni Iraqis form the ranks of this group.

AQI has issued claims of responsibility in Iraq for attacks on American and Iraqi security forces, often claiming several attacks in one day. The group uses a variety of tactics that include RPG attacks against armored vehicles, guerilla style attacks by armed militants, suicide bombings, and the kidnapping and beheadings of foreigners.

Al-Qaida in the land of the Two Rivers, which is believed to derive most of its domestic support from Sunni Arabs, has focused on attacking Shiite Arabs and the fledgling Iraqi police force. This group is blamed for the bombing of a Shia shrine in Samarra in February of 2006 and June of 2007, which set off a series of deadly reprisal killings between Sunnis and Shias.

In addition to these frequent smaller scale attacks in Iraq, the group claimed responsibility for the bombing of three hotels in Amman, Jordan that left 67 people dead and injured more than 150.

In January 2006, the group was one of six insurgent organizations to unify under the Mujahideen Shura Council. As of now, all attacks perpetrated by al-Qaida in Iraq are claimed in the name of the Council.

B. Mujahideen Shura Council

The Mujahideen Shura Council, “Freedom Fighter Consultation Council,” is an umbrella organization made up of several terrorist groups in Iraq, including AQI.

The Mujahideen Shura Council first appeared in spring 2005 when it claimed the kidnapping of Australian citizen Douglas Wood. Wood was a contractor with the American firm Bechtel. The group demanded the departure of all foreign forces in Iraq. Wood was freed by Iraqi forces in an operation in June 2005 after being held several weeks.

Despite the high-profile nature of this incident, the Council did not claim responsibility for any more attacks for several months.

In January 2006, several Sunni insurgent groups announced that they were joining to form the Mujahideen Shura Council. They claimed to unite in order to continue the struggle and force out the “invading infidels.” The groups that formed the council included: al-Qaida Organization in the Land of the Two Rivers, Jaish al-Taifa al-Mansoura, al-Ahwal Brigades, Islamic Jihad Brigades, al-Ghuraba Brigades, and Saraya Ansar al-Tawhid.

The idea of the Council is to unify insurgent efforts in Iraq against government and Coalition forces. It may also be an attempt to mend a rift between various Sunni insurgent groups. But it is clearly an attempt to unify disparate groups with a radical Sunni ideology driven to destroy the Iraqi government and its international support.

The formation of the Council is also possibly to shore up support for the insurgency by distancing itself from the extremely violent tactics and targeting of innocent Iraqis by al-Qaida. The Council allows AQI to continue its methods without claiming direct responsibility. It is now the organization claiming attacks by its member factions. Thus, the goals of the Council and its members are the same: the removal of U.S. troops from Iraq and the formation of an Islamic government in place of the current government.

C. Ansar al-Sunnah

Ansar al-Sunnah (“Followers of the Tradition”) is a group of Iraqi Jihadists attempting to establish an Islamic state with Shariah law in Iraq. They aim to achieve this by defeating Coalition Forces in the country. To them, Jihad in Iraq is obligatory for all Muslims, and anyone opposed to Jihad is their enemy. The group’s membership is varied, but includes radical Kurds in the Ansar al-Islam, foreign al-Qaidaand other Sunni terrorists.

The Ansar al-Sunnah has targeted coalition military, Iraqi soldiers and governmental institutions, and other political establishments in Iraq which the group treats as puppet regimes of American occupation. The group claims many attacks, many of which are unsubstantiated.
Ansar al-Sunnah has reportedly teamed up with the banned Arab Socialist Ba’th Part and AQI where they pledge to continue and increase attacks on the coalition and Iraqi government forces.

D. Islamic Army in Iraq

The Islamic Army in Iraq, IAI, conducts a brutally violent campaign against foreigners within Iraq, specifically anyone believed to be cooperating with the U.S.-led coalition. IAI has been implicated in several gruesome beheading deaths. The terrorist group aims to drive all U.S. and related Coalition forces, both military and civilian, from Iraq. But IAI does not limit its attacks to just these groups; it has also murdered French journalists, Pakistani contractors, an Italian journalist, and Macedonian citizens working for a U.S. company.

In the past, IAI has kidnapped individuals or group of people and then made demands impossible to meet. Frequently, these demands are indirectly related to the kidnapping victims. For example, IAI captured Enzo Baldoni, an Italian journalist who also volunteered for the Red Cross in Iraq. IAI demanded that Italy withdraw all troops from Iraq or Enzo Baldoni, both an independent journalist and humanitarian volunteer, would be killed. Italy did not recall its troops and Baldoni was murdered. This is a common tactic of IAI. The Islamic Army in Iraq has also attacked French civilians in retaliation for France’s law regarding headscarves in schools. IAI does not limit its terrorist attacks to non-Iraqis; the group has also executed Iraqi people who join Iraq’s police and military services.

According to old statements by the leader of the Islamic Army in Iraq, the group has thousands of terrorists in its ranks. The group’s leader also claims that the group is predominantly Iraqi, not foreign-born. Statements released in November 2004 announced that the Islamic Army in Iraq has collaborated with Ansar al-Sunnah and AQI.

"They Kill and Destroy. We Secure, Rebuild and Provide Hope.”

Responding to a tip, Soldiers with the 1st Cav were sent to investigate reports that terrorists had rigged two schools in Northern Baghdad with explosives. Extremists were able to destroy one school and rig a second with explosives:

CAMP TAJI, Iraq — Multi-National Division – Baghdad Soldiers, responding to a tip, were investigating two schools that were rigged to explode in a rural area in northern Baghdad when one exploded Aug. 16.

Soldiers with 2nd Battalion, 8th Cavalry Regiment, 1st Brigade Combat Team, 1st Cavalry Division, were investigating a tip gathered by Iraqi Army forces operating in the Al Awad area of northern Baghdad and conducting a deliberate clearing operation of one school when a second school nearby exploded.

The unit then started receiving small arms fire from insurgents in a tree line across the road from the school. The Soldiers then called in attack aviation to clear the tree line and the small arms fire ceased.

The Soldiers then proceeded to clear the school damaged by the explosion. There they found containers filled with high explosives planted in several areas around the school, some of which had not exploded. The school was assessed to be a complete loss.

The second school which the soldiers originally were trying to clear was also rigged with multiple containers of high explosives, but none of them exploded. All of the
unexploded containers were removed and destroyed by an explosive ordnance disposal team.

Al Qaeda extremists operating in the area are responsible for the emplacement of the explosives, according to Lt. Col. Peter Andrysiak, deputy commander of the 1st Brigade Combat Team, 1st Cavalry Division. He said extremists are attempting to disrupt Coalition efforts to facilitate the restoration of services and stop insurgent activities in the area.

This incident marks the fourth and fifth time insurgents have targeted schools in the
northern Baghdad area this year.

“This is a testimony of how little the Al-Qeada cares about the citizens of Iraq. They provide nothing of value to the Iraqi people,” Andrysiak said. “Al Qaeda is fearful of the largest reconciliation effort in Baghdad spreading to this area, but they haven’t
changed their tactics. They kill and destroy. We secure, rebuild and provide hope.”

Al Qaeda does not fight for the people of Iraq they are there simply to cause chaos and create a sense of fear and forboding in the populace, along with creating sensational headlines around the world in an effort to sway puplic opinion. Unfortunately the Western media plays into their hand and the Democratic leadership in this country follows suit, like the good little "useful idiots" they are.

Al Qaeda in Iraq is defeated, these acts of cowardice are the dying gasps of the movement as it seeks to sway public opinion one last time in an effort to gain them some breithign room so they can regroup. We can not allow this to happen and we must continue to pursue them with all means possible.

Insurgents Attack Iraqi Civilians

In an obvious attempt to sway world opinon and incite sectarian violence terrorists launched a rocket attack against civilian targets in Baghdad:

BAGHDAD — Five Iraqi citizens were killed when a 122MM rocket struck a building causing it to collapse in the Al Mansour district of Baghdad June 19.

Both Iraqi Army and Coalition Forces responded to the scene of the attack after a rocket struck the building in the neighborhood of Yarmouk, causing it to collapse and kill five Iraqi citizens and wound six others. The Yarmouk hospital confirmed the casualties U.S. Forces confirmed that the rocket was fired from north of the city approximately 10 miles away.

The attack is believed to have been carried out by Jaysh Al-Mahdi militants and was directed at the Sunnis region of Al-Mansour and is an idicator of how effective the surge is becoming in shrinking the terrorists ability to fight back.

Suspected al-Qaeda Emir, 14 Others Captured

MULTI-NATIONAL FORCE-IRAQ
COMBINED PRESS INFORMATION CENTER
Release A070226a

BAGHDAD, Iraq –Coalition Forces detained 15 suspected terrorists including a suspected al-Qaeda in Iraq emir during raids Monday morning targeting foreign fighter facilitators and the al-Qaeda in Iraq network.

During an operation in Baghdad, Coalition Forces captured a suspected al-Qaeda in Iraq emir and one of his associates. Three suspected foreign terrorist facilitators were captured in operations northeast of Samarra, and eight more were captured in a foreign fighter safe house west of Mahmudiyah.

In downtown Ramadi, Coalition Forces captured two suspects in a foreign fighter safe house. Intelligence reports indicated members of the cell were allegedly planning suicide operations against Coalition or Iraqi Forces.

“Coalition Forces are making progress dismantling the foreign fighter and al-Qaeda terrorist networks inside Iraq,” said Lt. Col. Christopher Garver, MNF-I spokesperson. "These operations send a message to terrorists that they will be caught and prosecuted for their crimes under the Iraqi justice system."

Listening to the Enemy

Al-Qa'ida's Sawt al-Jihad Magazine Threatens 'Major' Attacks

On 8 February, a jihadist website posted a message from the Al-Qa'ida Organization in the Arabian Peninsula, announcing the release of their 30th issue of their online magazine Sawt al-Jihad, and providing links to the publication in both PDF and Word formats. This 56-page issue comes after almost two years of absence. In the introduction of this edition, the author assures Bin Ladin that the mujahidin of Al-Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula are keeping their promise and are preparing for "what will please him," threatening new attacks against "Crusader" interests in the Arabian Peninsula. The magazine also includes an article on Bin Ladin's strategy to use "the oil weapon" against the West.

To find out what else was in this issue published by the enemy expand the post:

• "Oh, House of Salul -The Outcome Belongs to the Righteous," by Muhammad Ibn-Abdallah al-Nasir, is the introductory article in which the author reminds the House of Saud [The Saudi Royal family] of God's promise to the believers. Al-Nasir promises Usama Bin Ladin that the mujahidin are keeping their commitment, writing "Your soldiers in the Arabian Peninsula are working, planning and preparing for what will please you, and will please the believers." The author also threatens "Crusaders" in the Arabian Peninsula, adding: "With the beginning of this new year, we ask God to make it a year of victory and of empowerment for the mujahidin in the Arabian Peninsula. Let the Crusaders and their followers in the Arabian Peninsula know that we have been preparing, for a while, for major operations that will shake the foundations of the Crusaders in the Arabian Peninsula, with God's might and strength and not ours. The Crusaders will not enjoy their living in the peninsula of Muhammad, prayers and peace be upon him, as long as we breath. This matter is part of the project of the mujahidin that aims at cleansing the Arabian Peninsula from the filth of the polytheists and the bases of the Crusaders that are spread all over the Arabian Peninsula."
• "Eyewitness News as Seen through the Eyes of the Mujahidin," lists events that had taken place since the release of the 29th issue, beginning with the Buqayq oil refinery attack, which took place in February 2006, and ending with the escalation of the US military presence in the Arabian Gulf.
• "A Special Interview with one of the Partakers in the Buqayq Raid - Badr Ibn-Abdallah al-Humaydi," gives details of the Buqayq oil refinery attack, and accuses the Saudi government of lying about its outcome. This article is followed by copies of the two statements issued by the group last year, in which they claimed responsibility for the said attack.
• "Proving the Inaccuracy in Saying 'The Deed is Infidel but the Doer is not,'" by Shaykh Abdallah Ibn-Sa'd al-Fahd, argues that the doer of an infidel act should rightfully be considered infidel, as the one guilty of committing the act.
• "Issa Ibn-Sa'd Ibn-Muhammad Al Awshan- The Knight of Jihad Media," by Majid Ibn-Muhammad Ibn-Sa'id al-Qahtani, is a six-page article which gives a detailed biography of the Saudi jihadist and poet Issa Al Awshan, who was killed at the hands of Saudi security forces in 2004, after he had assumed the responsibilities of Al-Qa'ida's media activities following the death of his predecessor Yusuf al-Ayiri.
• "Declaring War on Iran," by Abu-Ali al-Shimali, says that the temporary "marriage of pleasure" between Iran and the US is over, and that the US is now preparing for a war against Iran.
• "A Shout Following the Whisper in the Ear of Salman al-Awdah," by Abu-Hamzah al-Najdi, reminds Islamic preacher and supervisor of the Islam Today Internet forum, cleric Salman al-Awda, of Yusuf al-Ayiri's advice to him not to support Hizballah, which he did not take seriously. Now, the author reiterates the same message and calls on Al-Awdah to stick to the true teachings of Islam.
• "The Anticipated Revolution," by Abu-Amir al-Najdi, is a poem that calls on the Muslims to rise and prepare for the revolution of glory.
• "Bin Ladin and Oil Weapon," by Adib al-Bassam, discusses the strategy of attacking oil installation and facilities, and explains that this has always been the strategy of Bin Ladin and Al-Qa'ida. It also explains its effectiveness in the war against industrial countries, especially the United States.
• "Iraq Yesterday and Today," by Yahya Ibn-Zayid Al Zayid, in which the author describes the situation in Iraq before and after the fall of Baghdad, and describes how the tree of jihad developed and grew, until it got to the formation of the Islamic State of Iraq.
• "Interview with Martyr: Karim al-Tuhami al-Mujati," is an interview conducted by the magazine with this Moroccan "jihad leader," only few days before he was killed in the Al-Ras attack, in April 2005. In this interview, Al-Mujati answers questions, discusses prisons in Bosnia and talks about the jihad leaders under whom he had fought.
• "Ask the People of Knowledge, Fatwas in Jihad and Religious Politics" part of a question and answer series about jihad. In this issue, Shaykh Abdallah Ibn-Sa'd al-Fahd answers the question: "What are the types of Al-Diyar [homes or countries]? And what are their rulings?" in which he explains the two types: The Muslim Diyar and the Diyar of the Infidels.
• "Readers' Contributions," is a section which includes letters from readers expressing admiration and support for the mujahidin.
• "Letters and Responses," is a section containing a number of responses to readers' letters. The magazine provides the http://contactus.arabform.com website address as contact information for readers to use for their correspondence.

In addition to the above, the magazine contains a footnote in which Sawt al-Jihad expresses its gratitude to the Global Islamic Media Front for their continuous support in releasing their productions. It also announces that the third series of "Blood that Will Not be Wasted" video on the "martyrs" of Al-Qa'ida Organization in the Arabian Peninsula, will be released soon, and will be available on their website.

In the final page, Sawt al-Jihad posts images of the covers of four of its publications and asks the readers to participate in their printing and distribution.

Still think the information war isn't important to winning this conflict? Think again, it is the complete apathy and unwillingness of the mainstream media to show to the world publications like this, that make the leadership around the world believe that there is no hope and that we must negotiate with the enemy. We can not let their words go unspoken and shown to the light of day. We must not let the isolationism of the democratic party and the appeasement factions around the world dictate to us our demise.

Coalition Force Members Treat Citizens; IP Targeted in Khalis Explosion

MULTI-NATIONAL DIVISION – NORTH
RELEASE No. 20070206-05

Multi-National Division – North PAO

KHALIS, Iraq– A vehicle-borne improvised explosive device detonated Sunday in Khalis, killing five and wounding 20 local citizens and Iraqi Police officers.

Two local nationals and two Iraqi Police officers were killed, and 12 local nationals and seven Iraqi Police officers were injured when the vehicle detonated in the market next to a bus station.

“Al Qaeda happened to be targeting more civilians in the Khalis area, attempting to disrupt their desire for freedom and independence. The IP attempted to stop the attack and were protecting the rule of law when the VBIED exploded – they are committed to their people,” said Col. David W. Sutherland, 3rd Brigade Combat Team, 1st Cavalry Division commander, and senior U.S. Army officer in Diyala province.
Read the Rest...