Elizabeth O'Bagy | Institute for the Study of War |The
Syrian regime has launched an offensive in the northern province of
Aleppo. This operation follows shortly after the regime victory at
al-Qusayr in Homs province, where Hezbollah forces and National Defense
Forces played key roles. Along with key regime units, these forces have
redeployed to Aleppo in support of this operation, indicating its
strategic significance to Assad. A regime victory at Minnakh Airbase,
north of Aleppo city, would secure regime resupply to forces clearing
the countryside north of Aleppo city, threatening the opposition
presence in the province and isolating opposition strongholds in Idlib
and al Raqqa.
On the heels of its success in
al-Qusayr, the Syrian government launched a new offensive against
rebel-held areas in Aleppo province, marked by the deployment of
thousands of Lebanese Hezbollah militants on June 2.[1] Focusing on
strategic targets in northern Aleppo province, government forces have
reinforced their defenses at Minnakh Airbase, and started to deploy on a
large scale in the surrounding countryside. The swift advance toward
Aleppo comes in lieu of regime force consolidation in positions
surrounding al-Qusayr in Homs province, suggesting that the Syrian
government believes its potential for success against a reeling rebel
force in the contested environs of Aleppo city outweighs the dangers of
losing some of the ground recently gained in al-Qusayr.
Syrian President Bashar
al-Assad likely perceives the current momentum shift in his favor as an
opportunity to deal a lethal blow to the opposition. Furthermore, he
likely seeks to defeat the armed opposition militarily before they can
be armed by Western powers. Given that rebel positions in Aleppo
province are not operationally oriented to counter a regime ground
campaign, and that the Syrian Military has been revitalized by
Hezbollah’s overt involvement in the conflict, it is not beyond reason
for the Syrian government to think that a primary offensive could lead
to results similar to those seen in al-Qusayr. However, despite its
impressive military gains in recent weeks, the Syrian government does
not have the forces required to simultaneously retake all rebel-held
areas of the country, and there are limits to the amount of
reinforcements that Hezbollah can provide. This suggests not only that
the regime will struggle to achieve a level of success in Aleppo, but
also that it will risk losing territory gained in recent offensives. The
regime faces the risk that its campaign may culminate before it reaches
its operational and strategic objectives.
The Syrian government is employing a familiar strategy in the potential battle for northern Aleppo, called Operation Northern Storm.[2] This
strategy proved successful in the battles for Wadi al-Deif and Maarat
al-Numan leading up to its victory in al-Qusayr. At the Wadi al-Deif
Airbase, next to the city of Maarat al-Numan in Idlib province, regime
military forces broke a significant rebel siege and were able to
re-establish an important strategic presence before attempting to retake
the rebel-controlled town of Maarat al-Numan.[3] Once in control of
Maarat al-Numan, government forces were then able to re-open critical
ground supply lines which allowed for the redirection of airpower and an
expansion of its air campaign over Homs province prior to its advance
on al-Qusayr. A similar operation is now underway at Minnakh Airbase,
where government reinforcements have been flown to help break through
the rebel siege, and clearance operations are occurring in the villages
located along the highway leading into Minnakh. If the regime is able to
break the siege at Minnakh, it will be able to push south to
consolidate its control of the highway leading into Aleppo city, thereby
cutting off an important supply line for the opposition. This will set
the stage for a potential siege of Aleppo city as government troops are
able to advance on the city from both the south and the north.
Another regime practice that it
has executed elsewhere centers on preparatory operations to clear the
towns and villages surrounding a principal objective. In al-Qusayr,
government troops led by Hezbollah guerilla forces first cleared
adjacent towns, such as Shamsin and Shinsar. Once in control of these
towns, the government proceeded to conduct preparatory bombardment of
al-Qusayr before sending in Hezbollah irregular forces, followed by
Syrian government infantry troops. This strategy included driving rebel
forces inward to compress their ranks and then isolating them to prevent
rebel reinforcement or resupply. The combination of these attacks
proved insurmountable, and the rebels were forced to retreat out of
al-Qusayr. The early stages of the government’s offensive in Aleppo
share these same characteristics, as government forces are focusing on
control of the airbases and supply lines while simultaneously clearing
surrounding towns, particularly Nebul and Zahra.[4] Both towns are
predominantly Shi‘i and have been heavily contested between opposition
and government forces, much like the villages to the southwest of
al-Qusayr. Neither side has demonstrated a clear advantage as of yet,
making the results of these specific clashes highly pertinent to the
upcoming offensive against Aleppo city.
The towns of Nebul and Zahra
are significant for three reasons. First, if the towns were to come
under complete government control, they could serve as important staging
grounds for attacks against Aleppo city. The regime could consolidate
its positions around Aleppo before launching an intensive ground
campaign. This was a successful approach in the siege of al-Qusayr, as
the regime cleared and gained control of towns neighboring al-Qusayr
leading up to the siege, providing them a base of support from which to
launch attacks. Second, the towns are strategically located along the
highway between Aleppo and Minnakh Airbase that leads to Turkey. This
highway has been used as an important resupply route for rebels fighting
in Aleppo city. If government forces took control of the surrounding
towns, they would be able to isolate and besiege rebel forces operating
in Aleppo city. Again, similar tactics were used by the government in
the battles for al-Qusayr and Wadi al-Deif, with rebels losing key
highway checkpoints in the days leading up to their retreat. Third,
government control of the towns would help solidify its control of
Minnakh Airbase, from which the Syrian Air Force can launch air raids
against rebel positions both within Aleppo city and in the surrounding
countryside.
Nebul and Zahra have been
defended for the last few months by Popular Defense Committees, militia
units composed of minorities who have armed themselves to protect their
communities against opposition fighters. These committees are directly
supported by the government and Iran.[5] Though these predominantly
Shi‘a Popular Defense Committees operating in the area had initially
agreed to a truce with rebel forces, the ceasefire failed on April 3rd
and clashes have occurred regularly since that time.[6] Despite
additional ceasefires attempts, the regime has largely been able to
disrupt attempts at mediation between the two communities. To this end,
the Popular Defense Committees have served as an important irregular
force on behalf the Syrian government, and thus far they have largely
cooperated with the regime on its recent offensive.
In addition to the local
Popular Defense Committees, thousands of Alawites belonging to
pro-government paramilitary troops are being sent to Aleppo. These Alawi
fighters function similarly to the Popular Defense Committees, forming
militia-like units within the government’s newly created National
Defense Force (NDF). The Syrian government is also relying extensively
on support from Hezbollah forces for operations in Aleppo. According to
rebels from Aleppo’s Tawhid Brigade, Hezbollah fighters are amassing
around the two strategic towns of Anadan and Harithan that could be used
to launch the government’s campaign to retake much of the rebel-held
areas in Aleppo.[7] One Hezbollah commander acknowledged that there
were at least 2,000 Hezbollah fighters in Aleppo province in preparation
for an attack on Aleppo city, which he claimed has already begun on
small scale.[8] While the combined effects of these reinforcements have
sustained the government’s campaign so far, there are growing signs of
strain, particularly for the Hezbollah units involved which have already
suffered more casualties than expected and have been forced to change
their rotation patterns. Hezbollah also faces growing domestic pressure
over their role in Syria.[9] Whether they will be able to sustain such a
high-level of involvement in Syria is debatable in light of their
political position and resource limitations. Thus, it could be argued
that the government has pushed on the offensive in Aleppo rather than
consolidating in Homs because they recognize that there is a certain
time limit to the all-out support it is receiving from Hezbollah.
Another prominent factor in the
unfolding situation has been the role of local Kurdish groups around
Aleppo. Relations have been tense between rebel groups and local Kurdish
groups that maintain control of Sheikh Maqsoud, a neighborhood in
northern Aleppo. Additionally, there has been a notable increase in the
amount of violence between the Kurdish Popular Protection Units (YPG)
and rebel forces northwest of Aleppo, in the Ifreen area. Reports from
Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR) show significant YPG-Rebel
clashes beginning on June 6th, the day after al-Qusayr fell under
government control. Clashes have continued throughout the Ifreen area,
as YPG forces have taken numerous villages along the main ground line of
communication leading from Aleppo city into Turkey, and have also
seized a number of connecting roads.[10] The YPG appears to be defending
and consolidating its territory. At the same time, YPG clashes with
regime forces have been noticeably absent. In fact, regime and YPG
agendas appear to be aligning with Kurdish elements reportedly
cooperating with regime forces to protect their territory and evict the
rebels from the area.[11] YPG forces have been largely successful in
seizing temporarily rebel-held territory, and they serve as another
obstacle to opposition control along the Turkey-Aleppo line of
communication. Overall, tense relations between the Arab and Kurdish
armed groups have proven a considerable weakness for the opposition, and
one that the regime will look to exploit further as it advances on
Aleppo city.
The recent surge in activity in
strategic locations around Aleppo has shown the regime’s willingness to
shift its attention away from its recent victory in al-Qusayr, and
instead to focus on a battle for northern Aleppo. The rebels’ main
supply line from Turkey flows into Aleppo, and then extends throughout
the rest of northern and central Syria. The loss of the Turkey-Aleppo
supply line would likely cripple rebel ability to contest areas
throughout the Aleppo and Idlib provinces and further south into central
Syria. It would also serve to further fragment the opposition movement,
as rebel groups would no longer control a geographically linked
territory from the east to the west, across Raqqa, Aleppo, and Idlib
provinces. With rebel groups bogged down in Aleppo city and others
isolated in positions to the west in Idlib province and to the east in
pocketed strongholds in Raqqa and Deir Ez-Zour provinces, it is highly
doubtful that opposition forces would be able to mount any offensive
capabilities against the government. While fighting would continue,
rebels would likely be forced to revert back to guerrilla tactics rather
than attempting to hold territory.
Although the recent gains made
by the Syrian government are likely to diminish overtime, at the present
time, momentum is clearly in the government’s favor. As the Syrian
opposition faces new incursions by pro-government forces, including
Hezbollah and other Iranian-sponsored militants, discussions to aid the
opposition have taken on added urgency. Given the backing of Assad’s
allies, it is unlikely that the opposition will be able to defend Aleppo
without external support. On June 12, Free Syrian Army leader General
Salim Idriss requested lethal support to the opposition in a pressing
letter to the White House, stating that they “cannot hold on to Aleppo
without these weapons.”[12] As the Obama Administration has declared
that the Assad regime has crossed a "red line" in the usage of chemical
weapons in Syria, a decision has been taken to begin supplying
opposition groups with lethal aid in the form of small arms and
ammunition, as well as possibly anti-tank weaponry.[13] A decision to
supply rebels with anti-aircraft weapons has so far been declined.
Whether this provision of aid will be sufficient to slow or reverse
regime advances remains to be seen.
[1] Loveday Morris, “In Syria, Hezbollah forces appear ready to attack rebels in city of Aleppo,” Washington Post, June 2, 2013.
[2] Alexander Besant, “Operation Northern Storm: Syrian army plans assault on Aleppo,” Global Post, June 10, 2013.
[3] Jonathan Dupree, “
Syria Update: Regime Breaks Siege at Wadi al-Deif,” Backgrounder, Institute for the Study of War, April 18, 2013.
[4] “Rebel fighters bombarded with rockets the Nubul and al-Zahra' towns,” SOHR, June 12, 2013
[5] Joseph Holliday, “The Assad Regime: from Counterinsurgency to Civil War,” Institute for the Study of War, March 2013.
[6]Syrian Observatory for Human Rights Facebook Page, April 3, 2013,
https://www.facebook.com/syriaohr.
[7] Julian Barnes and Adam Entous, “Rebels plead for weapons in face of Syrian onslaught,” Wall Street Journal, June 12, 2013.
[8] Morris, “In Syria, Hezbollah forces appear ready to attack rebels in city of Aleppo.”
[9] Morris, “For Lebanon’s Sunnis, growing rage at Hezbollah over role in Syria,” Washington Post, June 12, 2013.
[12] Julian Barnes and Adam Entous, “Rebels plead for weapons in face of Syrian onslaught,” Wall Street Journal, June 12, 2013.
[13] Mark Mazzetti, Michael R. Gordon, and Mark Landler, “U.S. is Said to Plan to Send Weapons to Syrian Rebels,” New York Times, June 13, 2013,
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/14/world/middleeast/syria-chemical-weapons.html?.
1 comment:
It is a Catch -22 situation for the US, Obama s a very humble US President who has bowed before the Saudi monarch. Should Obama aid the rebels against the Hezbollah?
http://i.telegraph.co.uk/multimedia/archive/01381/obama_bow_1381505c.jpg
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